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ABSTRACT PAGE
Roy Olmstead (1886-1966) made millions by smuggling Canadian whisky into Seattle 
during Prohibition. He was the defendant in the first wiretapping case to reach the U. S. 
Supreme Court. Before getting to the Supreme Court, Olmstead was tried in the federal 
courts in Seattle for conspiracy to violate the Volstead Act (the enabling legislation of the 
Eighteenth, or Prohibition, Amendment).
Olmstead v. United States reached the Court in 1928. In it, the Justices held that 
wiretapping did not qualify as a search and seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
and so did not necessitate a warrant. The court was split 5-4, with Chief Justice Taft 
writing the majority opinion and Justices Brandeis and Holmes writing separate dissents. It 
was in this case that Brandeis, in his dissent, first articulates the notion of a "right to be let 
alone"— the right to privacy.
A fresh look not only at his case from start to finish, but also the circumstances surrounding 
it, will allow consideration of the overzealousness of law enforcement officials, the 
emergence of criminal business enterprises, the new technologies and their use (or 
misuse) by law enforcement, and how these factors combined during Prohibition to create 
the historical moment when privacy would begin to be discussed by the Court.
This paper uses the Olmstead case as a lens through which to view these peculiar 
circumstances of Prohibition and the way they brought the issue of privacy to a head. 
While Olmstead was eventually overturned, Brandeis’s dissent is often cited in modern 
cases exploring issues of the limits of government intrusion into personal privacy when 
attempting to enforce drug legislation.
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1Prohibition. 1920-1933. At its best, it was a time of wild abandon, with 
speakeasies, jazz, and G-men. At its worst, it was a time of widespread disregard for 
federal law, endemic corruption of politics and law enforcement, and innocents caught in 
the crossfire of ruthless gangsters. Public perception of the Prohibition law, the agency 
designed to enforce that law, and the criminal enterprises that emerged to evade the law 
all contributed to an escalating judicial exploration of the Fourth Amendment.1 The 
contours of the “search and seizure” provision of the Amendment developed in tandem 
with the actual practices of law enforcement officials that investigated and arrested 
violators of the Prohibition laws. A social and legal environment emerged that tested the 
limits of government intrusion physically and theoretically into the life of a citizen. 
Eventually, in 1928, the United States Supreme Court began to discuss privacy as a right 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. This paper will examine the public response to the 
Prohibition law, the law enforcement apparatus that was legislated to enforce Prohibition, 
and the criminal enterprises that developed in the 1920s. It will explore the 
interconnections between these developments and Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis’s assertion in 1928’s Olmstead et. al. v. United States that privacy should be 
protected by law.
In the case of Olmstead v. U.S., which the Supreme Court decided in 1928, 
Associate Justice Louis Brandeis articulated the right to privacy for the first time in 
federal jurisprudence. The escalating controversies surrounding the Prohibition law and 
enforcement of that law led the case to the Court. Olmstead was the first wiretapping
1 "The right o f th e  p eop le to  be secure in their persons, h ouses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable  
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing th e place to be searched, and th e persons or 
things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
2case to reach the Supreme Court, where the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that federal 
officers could, without a warrant, install a wiretap and use the evidence obtained with it 
in prosecution, so long as the officers did not physically trespass on the defendant’s 
property. Though Brandeis wrote the dissent in the case, and the Court found in favor of 
the government, Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” later became the cornerstone of privacy 
law.2
Nicknamed ‘king of the bootleggers,’ Roy Olmstead managed his criminal 
enterprise without violence and intimidation. For four years before he was arrested in 
1924, Olmstead controlled the majority of liquor entering Seattle and supplied most of 
the Pacific Northwest. Rumrunning was his business; he had investors, lawyers, boats, 
over seventy-five employees, properties, and a complex network of international contacts 
and contracts dedicated to the enterprise. He made over $200,000 a month in his heyday, 
and kept millions of people supplied with liquor that was cheaper and safer than that 
supplied to the rest of the country.4 He did not dabble outside of booze-running; he did 
not allow his crew to carry weapons; he had no ties to gambling, prostitution, and murder. 
As a result, his case uniquely placed the investigation, arrest, prosecution, and conviction 
of Olmstead squarely within Prohibition law.
2 Olmstead et. al. v. United States 277 U.S. 4.38 (1928).
3 New York Times, "Seattle Dry Chief and Aides Indicted," May 2 7 ,1 9 3 0 .
4 In the Suprem e Court opinion, Chief Justice Howard Taft described O lm stead's "conspiracy o f amazing  
m agnitude to  import, p ossess and sell liquor unlawfully. It involved th e em p loym ent o f not less than fifty 
persons, o f tw o seagoing  v essels  for the transportation o f liquor to [from] British Columbia, o f sm aller 
vessels for coastw ise transportation to  th e State of W ashington, th e purchase and use of a ranch beyond  
th e suburban limits o f Seattle , with a large underground cache for storage and a num ber of sm aller caches  
in that city, the m aintenance o f a central office m anned with operators, th e em ploym ent of executives, 
salesm en , deliverym en, dispatchers, scouts, bookkeepers, collectors and an attorney. In a bad m onth  
sales am ounted  to  $176 ,000; th e aggregate for a year m ust have ex ceed ed  tw o  millions of dollars." 
Olmstead v. U.S. 211 U.S. 438 , 455-456 .
3Histories of temperance and alcohol in America from the time of the Founding 
Fathers through modem times have been written by many scholars.5 Many historians 
have focused on the temperance movement and the events leading up to Prohibition.6 
Others have concentrated on the politics and mechanisms leading to the repeal of the 
Eighteenth Amendment.7 Works devoted entirely to Prohibition exist, but are general in 
nature. Each of these general histories has a section on issues of enforcement, and some
o
even dedicate a few pages to Olmstead, either the man or the court case.
There are also several social histories of Prohibition and life during the 1920s. 
The earliest, Frederick Lewis Allen’s 1931 Only Yesterday: An Informal History o f the 
1920s, offered a unique perspective in that it was written just after the period it covers. 
Allen acknowledged that he could not benefit from the hindsight from which historians 
usually engage. He did, however, have the insight of contemporaries that he used to
5 For a history o f alcohol consum ption  from 1790  to  1840, s e e  W. J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An 
American Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). For studies that broadly sw eep  through the  
history of alcohol in America, s e e  Andrew Barr, Drink: A Social History o f America (New York: Carrol and 
Graf Publishers, Inc., 1999), Catherine Gilbert Murdock, Domesticating Drink: Women, M en, and Alcohol 
in America, 1870-1940  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) and Mark Edward Lender and 
Jam es Kirby Martin, Drinking in America: A History (New York: The Free Press, 1982).
6 For th e intersection b etw een  tem peran ce, politics, status, and class, s e e  Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic 
Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance M ovem ent (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 
1963). For an econom ic history o f th e tem p eran ce m ovem en t that also en com p asses prohibition, se e  
John J. Rumbarger, Profits, Power, and Prohibition: Alcohol Reform and the Industrializing o f America, 
1800-1930  (Albany: State University of N ew  York Press, 1989). For links b etw een  th e  cam paign for 
national Prohibition and Progressive reform s, se e  Jam es H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive 
Movement, 1900-1920  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963) and Ann-M arie Szymanski, 
Pathways to Prohibition: Radicals, Moderates, and Social M ovem ent Outcomes (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2003).
7 David E. Kyvig focused  on the legal processes and political support necessary for repeal in Repealing 
National Prohibition (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2000). Kenneth D. Rose studied  w om en's  
instrum entality in repeal in American Women and the Repeal o f Prohibition (New  York: N ew  York 
University Press, 1996).
8 Norman H. Clark, Deliver Us From Evil: An Interpretation o f American Prohibition (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1976) no m ention of O lm stead. Thomas M. Coffey, The Long Thirst: Prohibition in 
America: 1920-1933  (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1975) no m ention  o f O lm stead. John 
Kobler, Ardent Spirits: The Rise and Fall o f Prohibition (New York: Putnam, 1973) 327-332 . Edward Behr, 
Thirteen Years that Changed America (N ew  York: Arcade Publishing, 1996) 137-139 , 221.
4write about the things that mattered to people during the 1920s, “the fads, fashions and 
follies of the time, the things which millions of people thought about and talked about 
and became excited about and which at once touched their daily lives.” When he wrote 
his book, Prohibition had not yet been repealed. The picture he painted of the popular 
impression of the Prohibition experience is what was written at the beginning of this 
paper -  gangsters, corrupt and inefficient government agents, intemperance by many; in 
short, he portrayed a public that was frustrated with the “Noble Experiment.”9
The “coalescence of a modern culture” is the subject of Lynn Dumenil’s 1995 The 
Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s. She evaluates the 
experiences of African Americans, immigrants, and native-born ethnic peoples in the 
development of this modem culture. She describes an “erosion of community and 
personal autonomy in the face of an increasingly nationalized and organized society.” 
“The growth of corporate power, the developments reshaping politics, the transformation 
of work, and the emergence of mass consumer culture dramatically reshaped American 
life,’” she writes.10 Prohibition was a way for some to “impose cultural unity on an 
increasingly heterogeneous and complex society.”11 For this reason, she concludes,
“controversy over the amendment and its enforcement infused the political debates of the
1 0decade.” For the entirety of the 1920s, Prohibition lay at the center of debates over 
public and private power, class, and religious, racial, and ethnic identities.
9 Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Inform al History o f the 1920s (N ew  York: Harper and Row,
1931) x. Often attributed to  Herbert Hoover, this moniker for Prohibition is a corruption o f a phrase 
Hoover used  in a 1928 sp eech: "a great social and econom ic experim ent, noble in m otive and far-reaching 
in purpose." Herbert Hoover, The New Day: The Campaign Speeches o f Herbert Hoover (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1928) 29.
10 Lynn Dumenil, The Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s, Eric Foner, ed. (New  
York: Hill and Wang, 1995) 12-13.
11 Dumenil, The Modern Temper, 226.
12 Dumenil, The Modern Temper, 234.
5In his Daily Life in the United States, 1920-1940, David E. Kyvig focuses on the 
lived experiences of Americans, noting that differences in such experiences depended on 
diverse geographic, economic and social worlds.13 Kyvig frames his chronicle of daily 
life with the “easily observable sign” that Americans were entering a “new era” — the 
Eighteenth Amendment.14 Prohibition was a facet of daily life, whether in the context of 
technology, dating, music, immigration, literature, film, or urbanization.
Joshua Zeitz writes about the women who were influential in the 1920s in 
Flappers: A Madcap Story o f  Sex, Style, Celebrity, and the Women who Made America 
Modern. The ‘age of the flapper’ is “the story of America in the 1920s -  the first 
‘modem’ decade, when everyday life came under the full sway of mass media, celebrity, 
and consumerism, when public rights gave way to private entitlements, and when people 
as far and wide as Muncie, Indiana, and Somerset, Pennsylvania, came to share a national 
standard of tastes and habits.”15 Zeitz wrote about the women and men that created the 
image of the flapper, the women that lived as flappers, and those who embodied that 
image in the culture industries. One of the defining features of the flapper was 
“floutfing] the rules of Prohibition.”16 These social histories remind us that the alcohol 
and Prohibition permeated the daily lives of Americans.
Despite this rich work on the Prohibition Era, Roy Olmstead’s story has not yet 
been investigated deeply by historians, though Olmstead and the court case are present in 
much of the literature. Whispering Wires: The Tragic Tale o f  an American Bootlegger, 
by Philip Metcalfe, is the only work entirely dedicated to Olmstead, but is deeply flawed
13 David E. Kyvig, Daily Life in the United States, 1920-1940  (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002).
14 Kyvig, Daily Life, 3.
15 Joshua Zeitz, Flapper: A M adcap Story o f Sex, Style, Celebrity, and the Women Who M ade America 
Modern  (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006) 9.
16 Zeitz, Flapper, 117.
6as Metcalfe used no citations and changed information and testimony to help the 
narrative.17 Norman H. Clark’s The Dry Years: Prohibition and Social Change in 
Washington devoted a chapter to Olmstead called “The Rumrunner.” These eighteen
• 1 opages are the most thorough historical account of Olmstead’s activities. Walter F. 
Murphy approached the case from a political science perspective in his book,
Wiretapping on Trial: A Case Study in the Judicial Process. He uses Olmstead to 
“illustrate how the judicial process frequently operates as a part of the more general 
process of public policy making.”19 Kenneth M. Murchison discusses the legal 
significance of the Olmstead case at length in Federal Criminal Law Doctrine: The 
Forgotten Influence o f  Prohibition, but Olmstead’s story was relegated to a mere page of
90introduction to the case study.
There are also a few works on wiretapping or privacy. Most well-known is The 
Eavesdroppers, by Samuel Dash, Richard F. Schwartz and Robert E. Knowlton. This 
book was written as a result of an investigation sponsored by the Pennsylvania Bar 
Association in 1956. The book reviews the practice of wiretapping by law enforcement 
and private individuals. It then summarizes the actual tools used by wiretappers and both 
the federal and state laws associated with wiretapping. Although it is useful in learning 
about the mechanics of actually tapping a phone, its usefulness in this study is limited
17 Philip M etcalfe, Whispering Wires: A Tragic Tale o f an American Bootlegger (Portland, OR: Inkwater 
Press, 2007).
18 Norman H. Clark, "The Rumrunner," The Dry Years: Prohibition and Social Change in Washington 
(Seattle: University of W ashington Press, 1965) 161-178.
19 W alter F. Murphy, Wiretapping on Trial: A Case Study in the Judicial Process (New York: Random House, 
1965) 9.
20 Kenneth M. M urchison, Federal Criminal Law Doctrines: The Forgotten Influence o f Prohibition (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1994) 65-68.
7• 91since it is temporally based so long after the Prohibition period. Privacy on the Line: 
The Politics o f Wiretapping and Encryption, by Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, is 
more relevant. The chapter on “Privacy Protection in the United States” discusses the 
evolution of legal protections privacy in America since colonial times. This chapter also 
discusses at length how the concept of privacy is embedded in American (and 
international) legal culture, and the reasons why privacy is so important. There is also a 
chapter specifically dedicated to wiretapping and how it evolved from eavesdropping and 
letter opening, which then traces the law and jurisprudence pertaining to wiretapping.22
The legal-historiography of the Olmstead case centers on the privacy rights 
touched on by Chief Justice Howard Taft (in the majority opinion) and Associate Justice 
Louis Brandeis (in his dissent). Most legal scholars have since sided with Brandeis’s 
belief that privacy is not bounded by physical space and that law enforcement should not 
be allowed to enter citizens’ private sphere even remotely. Some contemporary writers 
found Taft’s opinion valid in arguing that a physical trespass is necessary to prompt a 
constitutionally-protected privacy right -  but -  Brandeis’s dissent is still cited today (as 
good law, since Olmstead was overturned in 1967). A Lexis-Nexis search revealed 
nearly 2,500 law journal articles citing this case, on such varied topics in privacy law as 
employers accessing employees’ internet or email accounts, sexuality in the home, 
pornography, children accessing adoption records, investigation of drug and smuggling
* 9^operations, and government surveillance technology in the wake of 9/11.
21 Samuel Dash, Richard F. Schwartz, and Robert E. Knowlton, The Eavesdroppers (New York: Da Capo 
Press York, 1971).
22 W hitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics o f Wiretapping and Encryption 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007) 141-204.
23 Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438: "The Fourth A m endm ent [is not] violated against a defendant unless 
there has been  an official search and seizure of his person, or such seizure of his papers or his tangible
8Olmstead, and Olmstead, are embedded within the literature of Prohibition, as are 
the issues surrounding enforcement of the Volstead Act and the resulting implications for 
the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. This paper serves to pull the 
scattering of commentary on these issues from disparate sources, and directly confront 
the Prohibition-Era Fourth-Amendment jurisprudence within its historical context.
The National Prohibition Act, or Volstead Act, was passed over presidential veto 
on October 27, 1919.24 This was the enabling legislation for the Eighteenth Amendment
25-  the Prohibition Amendment, which was ratified on January 16, 1919. The Volstead 
Act went into effect in January of 1920. The law outlawed the sale, manufacture, or 
distribution of alcohol for beverage purposes, with alcohol defined as anything above .05 
percent alcohol by volume (ABV). Significantly, the Act prohibited neither the purchase 
nor possession of alcohol.
After Prohibition became law, many Americans simply kept drinking. In fact, 
according to Edward Behr, there was “an almost immediate, nationwide change in 
drinking habits” as Americans seemed to embrace drinking. According to Behr, defying
material effects, or an actual physical invasion o f his house or 'curtilage' for th e purposes o f making a 
seizure. W e think, therefore, that th e w iretapping here disclosed did not am ount to  a search or seizure 
within the m eaning o f th e  Fourth A m endm ent." (Taft writing for the majority) Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 
at 455-456; "They [the m akers of th e Constitution] conferred, as against th e G overnm ent, th e right to  be 
let alone -  the m ost com prehensive of rights and th e right m ost valued by civilized m en. To protect that 
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by th e G overnm ent upon th e privacy o f  th e individual, w hatever the  
m eans em ployed, m ust be d eem ed  a violation o f th e Fourth A m endm ent. And th e use, as evidence in a 
criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion m ust be d eem ed  a violation o f th e  Fifth." 
(Brandeis dissenting) Olmstead v. U.S., 227 U.S. at 478-479.
24 41 U.S. Stat. 305, Title II: PROHIBITION OF INTOXICATING BEVERAGES, Sec. 3: "No person shall... 
m anufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish, or p o ssess  any intoxicating liquor 
excep t as authorized in this Act." The Act did permit the m anufacture and sale o f sacram ental alcohol and 
alcohol for non-beverage purposes -  sacram ental w ine, industrial alcohol, and m edicinal alcohol. It also  
allow ed the hom e production of fruit-based ferm ented  beverages (i.e. ciders and w ine), so  long as they  
w ere "non-intoxicating." For th ese  beverages, th e Act did not specify an ABV as ipso facto  intoxicating.
25 U.S. Const. Amend. XVIII, Sec. 1: "After o n e  year from the ratification o f this article th e  m anufacture, 
sale, or transportation o f intoxicating liquors within, th e im portation th ereo f into, or th e exportation  
th ereo f from the United S tates and all territory subject to  the jurisdiction th ereo f for beverage purposes is 
hereby prohibited."
9the law “became the thing to do, among students, flappers, and respectable middle-class 
Americans all over the country.”26 In New York City, the popular press printed “weekly 
quotes for cases of scotch, gin, and other spirits, noting when enforcement pressures had 
driven prices up, and when a glut of supplies meant bargains were to be had on the black 
market.” Lois “Lipstick” Long reviewed the various speakeasies across the city in her 
column for The New Yorker. When Gustav Boess, the mayor of Berlin, visited New York
City in 1929 he asked James J. Walker, mayor of New York City, “When does the
0 1Prohibition law go into effect?” It had been in effect for nearly ten years. The image 
projected by the media was that drinking was rampant. “Magazines and movies implied
ORthat plenty of drinking was taking place,” wrote Kyvig. Novels like The Great Gats by 
and films like Flaming Youth gave the impression that no one was obeying Prohibition.29 
Both historians and contemporaries debated whether or not consumption of alcohol 
increased during Prohibition, but the character of drinking was perceived to have 
changed, to have become a flagrant act of defiance.
When the Eighteenth Amendment was sent to the states for ratification in 1919, it 
was unclear if a majority of the country actually supported the Amendment. Chief 
Justice William Howard Taft predicted that the Eighteenth Amendment would be
26 Behr, Prohibition, 89.
27 Michael A. Lerner, Dry M anhattan: Prohibition in New York (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007) 1, 48. Zeitz, Flapper, 98-103.
28 Kyvig, Daily Life, 25.
29 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The G reat Gatsby (New York: Scribner, 1925). Flaming Youth, directed by John 
Francis Dillon (1923).
30 Part o f th e problem  is th e  difficulty in assessing consum ption  w hen there is no record o f sales. Deaths 
from cirrhosis o f  th e liver declined during Prohibition, which indicates d ecreased  consum ption, but is not 
probative. The W ickersham Com m ission felt that drinking probably increased, especially  by young people  
and w om en. National Comm ission on Law O bservance and Enforcem ent, A Report o f the National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement Relative to the Facts as to the Enforcement, the 
Benefits, and the Abuses under the Prohibition Laws, both Before and Since the Adoption o f the Eighteenth 
Am endm ent to the Constitution,! 1st Cong. 3rd sess., House D ocum ent No. 722. (G overnm ent Printing 
Office: W ashington, 1931) 22.
10
incorporated into the Constitution, “against the views and practices of a majority of the 
people in many of the large cities and in one-fourth or less of the States.” His 
prediction was realized. It is uncertain whether the Amendment would have been ratified 
had there actually been a popular vote. Though ratification was successful; the 
amendment was never submitted to a referendum. In fact, Ohio attempted to submit the 
question to its citizens, and the United States Supreme Court found that this violated the 
Constitution. Under Article V of the Constitution, Congress has the discretion to submit 
an amendment for ratification by either state legislatures or conventions. The Eighteenth 
Amendment was sent to state legislatures for ratification, not the citizens of the states.
And so, as Kyvig wrote, Prohibition began with an “image of a reform achieved by 
undemocratic means.” Whether or not the Amendment would have passed by popular 
vote in each state, a significant minority of the population that disagreed as Volstead 
went into effect.
There were practical reasons to disobey the law. The Volstead Act put thousands 
out of work, with no provisions for employing the waiters, bartenders, saloon owners, 
brewers, transporters, and warehouse owners who had made their living from the 
manufacture, transportation, or sale of alcohol. In 1915, there were 1,345 breweries 
operating in the United States.34 In 1913, liquor manufacturers employed 62,920 people;
31 National Comm ission on Law O bservance and Enforcem ent, Enforcement o f the Prohibition Laws: 
Official Records o f the N ational Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement Pertaining to Its 
Investigation o f the Facts as to the Enforcement, the Benefits, and the Abuses under the Prohibition Laws, 
both before and since the Adoption o f the Eighteenth Am endm ent to the Constitution, 71st Cong., 3d. sess., 
Senate D ocum ent 307. 5 vols. (W ashington: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1931), vol. V, 201.
32 Hawke v. Smith 253 U.S. 251 (1920).
33 Kyvig, Repealing, 14-16.
34 Martin Stack, "Local and Regional Breweries in America's Brewing Industry, 1865 to  1920" The Business 
History Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), 435-463 , 449.
11
o c
there were 100,000 bartenders and 68,000 saloon keepers employed in 1910. While a 
few wealthy people were affected, notably the owners of breweries, the economic burden 
of Prohibition fell on the working class, who overwhelmingly opposed Prohibition.
Frank Duffy, the General Secretary of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners 
of America, estimated that more than 95 percent of workers “are opposed to these laws 
and also to their enforcement, believing them to be a curtailment of their guaranteed 
rights.”37 Daniel J. Tobin, General President of the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers in Indianapolis, added that “the working people of 
America... have a feeling that their freedom has been somewhat interfered with by 
legislation.” Not only did they disagree with Prohibition, but workers were most likely 
to be arrested and charged with Prohibition violations. Edward Behr asserts that 
“Prohibition agents concentrated their efforts on those they could not shake down; that is, 
the poor, the barely literate, the recent immigrants least able to defend themselves.”
While he emphasized this “two-tier” justice as being a product of wealthy violators’
TQimmunity to prosecution, it was also a deliberate attack on the lower class.
Many working class Americans saw Prohibition as a project of the wealthy to 
control the poor, branding the lower class criminals while the upper class had cocktail
35 L. Am es Brown, "Economics o f Prohibition" The North American Review, Vol. 203, No. 723 (Feb., 1916), 
256-264, 263. D eets Pickett, "Prohibition and Economic Change" Annals o f the American Academy o f  
Political and Social Science, Vol. 163, Prohibition: A National Experiment (Sep., 1932) 98-104 , 101.
36 Annheuser-Busch diversified and sold o ff or rented out real es ta te  to  survive Prohibition; Pabst also  
diversified, bought a soft drink com pany, and m erged with a malt product corporation; Schlitz sold off tw o  
thousand properties. Over half o f th e brewers operating in 1918 closed . The on es that survived had 
am ple cash reserves to  diversify. M aureen Ogle, Ambitious Brew: The Story o f American Beer (Orlando,
FI.: Harcourt, 2006) 183-188. In a national Literary Digest poll in 1922, w orkingm en favored m odification  
of th e Volstead Act by m ore than nine to  one. Larry Engelman, "Organized Thirst: The Story of Repeal in 
Michigan," in Alcohol, Reform and Society: The Liquor Issue in Social Context, Jack S. Blocker, Jr., ed. 
(W estport, Conn.: G reenw ood Press, 1979) 1 7 1 -2 1 0 ,1 7 2 .
37 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3, 290.
38 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3, 274.
39 Behr, Prohibition, 241.
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parties. In Profits, Power, and Prohibition, John J. Rumbarger found that “the liquor 
question itself was the ideological creation of America’s dominant social class seeking to 
expand its hegemony over the lives of the country’s propertyless masses.”40 The 
wealthiest members of society did not feel the effects of Prohibition as strongly because 
they simply ignored the law. William Stayton, member of the Association Against the 
Prohibition Amendment, wrote that “the workman has long believed that the campaign 
for national prohibition was financed by the employer for the purpose of increasing 
output.”41 Rumbarger demonstrated that this was true. According to Allen, “among the 
prosperous classes which set the standards of national social behavior, alcohol flowed 
more freely than ever before.”42 When prices of alcohol increased 500 to 600 percent, 
the wealthy could afford the increase.43 The laws were strictly enforced in ethnic and 
working-class communities, while the wealthy could join an exclusive club, pay off 
enforcement officers, and hire an effective litigator in the rare instances that they were 
targeted.44
These ideological rationales helped to reinforce the disparity in impact on 
different economic and social classes. Michael A. Lemer described Prohibition as a 
“fourteen-year-long cultural conflict over the nature of American identity.”45 While the 
mostly Anglo/white upper class supported or rejected Prohibition easily, ethnic and racial 
minorities viewed the dry movement as a “crusade in bigotry.”46 Dry crusaders spoke
40 Rumbarger, Profits, Power, and Prohibition, 188.
41 W. H. Stayton, "Our Experiment in National Prohibition. W hat Progress Has It Made?" Annals o f the 
American Academy o f Political and Social Science, Vol. 109, Prohibition and Its Enforcem ent (Sep., 1923), 
26-38, 31.
42 Allen, Only Yesterday, 96.
43 Kyvig, Daily Life, 22.
44 Lemer, Dry M anhattan , 110-112.
45 Lerner, Dry M anhattan, 3.
46 Lerner, Dry M anhattan, 30, 3.
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and wrote in anti-immigrant rhetoric, blasting German breweries, Jewish and Italian 
wine-drinking, and Irish whiskey. They never effectively distanced themselves from this 
bigotry.47 According to Lynn Dumenil, the problems of “crime, prostitution, and 
violations of prohibition” became “associated in the old-stock mind with immigrants and 
African Americans.” She described the impetus for the passage of the Eighteenth 
Amendment as “inseparable from the nativism and anti-Catholicism deeply embedded in 
nineteenth-century political culture.” By the twentieth century, the “battle for 
prohibition” had become “an ethnic conflict.” She describes prohibitionists as 
“overwhelmed by immigrant masses whose religion, language, values -  especially of 
sexual morality, drink, and leisure -  seemed so much at odds with mainstream values.” 
Dry crusaders hoped that the Volstead Act would “coerce assimilation” to “Protestant
A O
middle-class values.” Even if ethnic and racial minorities chose to not obey the law, 
Joseph Gusfield wrote, it was these crusaders’ “culture that had to be evaded... and 
morality that was transgressed.”49 Ethnic and racial Americans fully comprehended the 
Prohibition law and its enforcement as an attempt to “police the habits of the poor, the 
foreign-born, and the working class.”50 Resistance to what they viewed as an attempt to 
annihilate their culture took many forms, but “resistance to the dry laws became a form of 
protest against the cultural authority of Protestant drys who presented themselves as the 
defenders of all things genuinely American.”51 Flouting Prohibition, ethnic Americans 
“asserted their own identity” in the face of “the ultimate nativist reform.” For these
47 Lerner, "Brewers o f Bigotry," Dry M anhattan , 96-126.
48 Dumenil, M odern Temper, 239, 227-8.
49 Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, 122.
50 Lerner, Dry M anhattan , 96.
51 Lerner, Dry M anhattan, 100.
52 Dumenil, Modern Temper, 30.
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Americans, the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act were invading not just their 
physical home, but attacking and intruding on their cultural identity and the expression of 
that identity.
Many Americans saw the Amendment as an intrusion on their personal life 
choices, whether those choices were linked specifically to cultural identity or simply 
freedom. Underlying the unpopularity of the act was the nature of the Eighteenth 
Amendment itself. It is the only Constitutional amendment that is framed in terms of a 
prohibition, not a right.53 And because of this, people saw the law itself as invading their 
privacy. This sentiment was widespread across society. In 1922, Fabian Franklin 
published What Prohibition Has Done to America. Once a professor of mathematics at 
Johns Hopkins University and then associate editor of The New York Evening Post, 
Franklin presented the Eighteenth Amendment as a “Constitutional monstrosity” and a 
“degradation of the Constitution.”54 Working men voiced similar opinions -  that “their 
freedom has been somewhat interfered with by legislation,” that the laws and their 
enforcement were “a curtailment of their guaranteed rights under the Bill of Rights and 
other sections of the Constitution,” and that it “infringes on personal liberty.”55 
Wickersham Commission member Henry W. Anderson wrote in his addendum to the 
official Report that citizens “feel that the present law attempted too much -  went too far
53 W hile th e  Thirteenth and Fourteenth A m endm ents effectively circum scribed citizens' actions, they  are 
fram ed in term s o f granting rights.
54 Fabian Franklin, W hat Prohibition Has Done to America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 
1922) 9, 11.
55 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3, 273-274  (Daniel J. Tobin, the General President o f th e  International 
Brotherhood o f Team sters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers). NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3 290  (Frank Duffy, 
General Secretary o f th e United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners). NCLOE, Enforcement,m o \. 3, 261  
(Adolph J. Fritz, Secretary o f th e  Indiana State Federation o f Labor).
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in its invasion of personal rights.”56 The law’s “impairment of constitutional guarantees 
of individual rights” was part of the declaration of the Women’s Organization for
* 57National Prohibition Reform at their first convention. According to David Kyvig, the 
Eighteenth Amendment brought “the federal government into people’s daily lives in a
c o
fashion never before experienced in peacetime.”
Not only did the law seem to reach invisibly into people’s homes, but the 
Prohibition agents physically infringed on people’s liberty. In its incorporation statement 
the Volunteer Committee for Lawyers, an organization of lawyers dedicated to the repeal 
of the Eighteenth Amendment, reasoned that national Prohibition had allowed the 
government to resort to “improper and illegal acts in the procurement of evidence and 
infringement of such constitutional guarantees as immunity from double jeopardy and 
illegal search and seizure.”59 These concerns were not unfounded. William S. Kenyon, a 
member of the Wickersham Commission, wrote that “public sentiment against the 
prohibition laws has been stimulated by irritating methods of enforcement, such as the 
abuse of search and seizure processes, invasion of homes and violations of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution, entrapment of witnesses, [and] killings by prohibition 
agents.”60 Wickersham Committee member Paul J. McCormick went further, calling the 
Bureau’s enforcement methods “fanatical, illegal, and corrupt.”61 Kyvig describes law
56 NCLOE, Report, 91. The National Commission on Law O bservance and Enforcem ent w as called the  
"Wickersham Commission." This was a Senate Comm ission tasked in 1931 with investigating "the 
enforcem ent, th e benefits, and th e  abuses under the Prohibition laws."
57 Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition, 123 (citing Transcript, WONPR first convention, WONPR Papers. -  
W om en's Organization for National Prohibition Reform Papers, in Alice Belin du Pont files, Pierre S. du 
Pont Papers. Eleutherian Mills Historical Library. W ilm ington, DE).
58 Kyvig, Daily Life, 3.
59 Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition, 128 (citing Voluntary C om m ittee for Lawyers' incorporation  
sta tem en t published in New  York Herald-Tribune on January 23, 1929).
60 NCLOE, Report, 120-122.
61 NCLOE, Report, 155.
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enforcement during the Prohibition years as “more aggressive and intrusive” and 
“assuming new powers.”62 A 1927 article in the Yale Law Journal found that “more than 
700 cases involving the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence [had been] reported” 
since 1920. “The number of liquor cases turning upon the rule ha[d] increased from four 
during the first year [of Prohibition] to more than 220 during the past year.”63
Often search warrants were granted based on dubious information, even on the 
basis of a mere anonymous tip or perjured testimony.64 Roy Haynes recounts a story of 
two Prohibition agents who threatened to shoot an unarmed teenager in their custody. 
Three women were about to attack the agents with an iron bar, a rolling pin, and “a bit of 
rough lumber.” They ceased their attack to save the life of the boy.65 In the investigation 
and arrest of George Remus, a federal agent entered Remus’s hotel suite in Columbus, 
Ohio, inserted a microphone in the wall, and proceeded to transcribe everything that 
happened in the room.66 Major Maurice E. Campbell, Prohibition Administrator for the 
Eastern District of New York, recounted raiding a club without a warrant and destroying 
all of the furniture inside -  he termed this “confiscating” the property -  which was
f \  7allowed if the person had not paid taxes on the liquor they sold. In 1931, the Chief,
Division of Schools, Bureau of Prohibition, described “a lack of knowledge combined
with the inexperience of many of the officers” resulting in ... illegal searches and 
,,68seizures.
62 Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition, 35.
63 Osm ond K. Fraenkel, "Recent D evelopm ents in th e Law of Search and Seizure," 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1 
(1928).
64 Rose, American Women and the Repeal o f Prohibition, 49-50.
65 Haynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 26-27.
6666 Behr, Prohibition, 168.
67 Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 236-7.
68 Harry M. Dengler, "Training o f Prohibition Enforcem ent Officers in th e United States" The American 
Journal o f Police Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan-Feb., 1931) 45-51, 1.
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In addition to questionable searches, seizures, and arrests, Prohibition 
enforcement took its toll on civilian and enforcement personnel. The reported number of 
civilian and federal officers killed “incidental to operations” in enforcing the Volstead 
Act was 286 from 1920-1930.69 It is nearly impossible to estimate the number of 
civilians killed by state and local officials; estimates range from eight hundred to thirteen 
hundred people. Many of these civilian deaths were due to the incompetence of the 
agents. Explanations for individual killings included poor aim at a tire, tripping, or the 
suspicion that the civilian was carrying a weapon. Some were even shot in the back 
while fleeing.70 As an example of these acts of “self-defense: “An Agent Rudolph 
Brewer attempted to arrest seventy-year old Charles Gundlacht. Gundlacht fired at 
Brewer, wounding his knee. Brewer fired back and hit Gundlacht’s foot. “As he lay on 
the ground begging for mercy, Brewer stood over him and put a bullet through his 
head.”71
These violations of the Constitution were due in large part to the inexperience and 
ineffectiveness of the federal agents of the Prohibition Bureau who were charged with 
enforcing the Prohibition laws. Originally under the aegis of the Treasury Department, 
the Bureau was consistently understaffed, its agents underpaid, underqualified and often 
corrupt. For these reasons, the turnover rate within the Bureau was extraordinarily high, 
further eroding its efficiency. The Bureau’s mandate -  to stop the sale and trafficking of 
liquor throughout the United States -  was impossible given these circumstances. This 
became more apparent, and in 1931 President Herbert Hoover appointed the National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the “Wickersham Commission” or
69 NCLOE, Enforcement, 491.
70 NCLOE, Enforcement, 491-515.
71Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 288-289. For m ore an ecd otes, s e e  289-294.
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NCLOE) to investigate problems of law enforcement in general, and specifically the 
Volstead Act.72
The Prohibition Bureau was created in 1921 with an appropriation of 6.35 million 
dollars; by 1924 its appropriation had increased to 8.25 million dollars, and 12.7 million 
dollars by 1930.73 This funding could not support enough personnel, nor could it 
adequately compensate those who did work for the agency.75 The 1931 Wickersham 
Commission investigation found that “the activities of the bureau have been cut to fit a 
sum established at Washington rather than fit the known requirements of the task to be
nn
accomplished.” The Wickersham Commission finally recommended “substantial
78increase” in federal appropriations.
In 1924, 1,652 agents were assigned to patrol the entire United States, over 3.5
o A
million square miles and a population of just over 106 million people. While Congress 
expected that local agencies would also investigate and prosecute offenders, it was still 
geographically impossible for this number of men to patrol even the United States’ 
borders, much the less its interior. As Allen put it: “If the whole army of agents in 1920 
had been mustered along the coasts and borders -  paying no attention at the moment to 
medicinal alcohol, breweries, industrial alcohol, or illicit stills -  there would have been 
one man to patrol every twelve miles of beach, harbor, headland, forest, and riverfront.”81
72 W hile scholars d isagree on th e m erits o f th e  final Report o f th e Com m ission, the research and data that 
was collected  is useful in detailing th e  Prohibition experience and th e se  d ocu m ents will be used to
support th e con ten tion s put forth in this paper. Doek-Ho Kim, '"A H ouse Divided:' The W ickersham
Comm ission and National Prohibition," PhD diss., State University of N ew  York at Stony Brook, 1992.
73 NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2, 216-291.
7S NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 452.
77 NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2 ,1 2 8 .
78 NCLOE, Report, 83.
80 h ttp ://w w w .cen su s .gov /h istory /w w w /th rou gh _th e_d ecad es/fa st_ facts/1920_fast_ facts.h tm l, accessed
20 February 2011. NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2, 208.
81 Allen, Only Yesterday, 216.
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It was just not mathematically possible for this small force to succeed if significant 
numbers of people violated the Act. Anderson wrote in his addendum to the report, “If 
the people.. .send into action for its enforcement.. .a small force of from 1,000 to 1,500 
underpaid men against a lawless army running into tens of thousands, possessed of 
financial resources amounting to billions, ready to buy protection at any cost, the people
ft?must expect unsatisfactory results and heavy moral casualties.”
When the Wickersham Commission published its Report, it recommended
R4increasing the number of agents in the Bureau by 60 percent. This report was published 
in 1931, when number of agents working for the Bureau had been increased to over 
2,500.85 Agents were not only overwhelmed by the vastness of the country, but also the 
scope of the responsibilities delegated to the Prohibition Bureau. These included 
“policing the nation’s borders for illegal smuggling; making raids and arrests for alcohol 
sales; licensing the manufacture, storage, and distribution of industrial alcohol; regulating
o/r
the supply of medicinal alcohol; and monitoring the dispensation of sacramental wine.”
As Allen illustrated, there were barely enough agents to monitor the borders. Lemer 
noted that the Bureau was the “largest rionmilitary federal law enforcement body in the 
country,” but the prevalence of alcohol and widespread violation of the law made the size
07
of the Bureau inadequate to effectively enforce the law.
As Wickersham Commission member Henry Anderson alluded, the agents of the 
Prohibition Bureau were also underpaid for this difficult and often dangerous work. “The 
agents’ salaries in 1920 mostly ranged between $1,200 and $2,000 [below the mean
82 NCLOE, Report, 12, 16, 97. S ee also Kobler, A rdent Spirits, 271.
84 NCLOE, Report, 64-65.
85 NCLOE, Enforcement, 208.
86 Lemer, Dry M anhattan , 64.
87 Lemer, Dry M anhattan , 65.
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income of $2,500].88 Again, Allen’s eloquence is striking: “Anybody who believed that 
men employable at thirty-five or forty or fifty dollars a week would surely have the 
expert technical knowledge and the diligence to supervise successfully the complicated 
chemical operations of industrial alcohol plants or to outwit the craftiest devices of 
smugglers and bootleggers, and that they would surely have the force of character to 
resist corruption by men whose pockets were bulging with money, would be ready to
O Q
believe in Santa Claus, perpetual motion, and pixies.” The salary was not high enough 
to attract people qualified for the technical aspects of the job or experienced in law 
enforcement and investigation. The agents were paid far less than the average American, 
yet were expected to resist when presented with ways to offset their meager income.
The Wickersham Commission Report attributed the low caliber of men that 
applied to work for the Bureau to these low salaries. “The salaries of prohibition agents 
were too low to be attractive. There has been much criticism of the character, 
intelligence, and ability of many of the force originally appointed.”91 The agents were 
often unqualified to perform law enforcement tasks. On April 1, 1930, according to the 
Wickersham Commission, “half the present force were [sic] totally inexperienced in 
police or investigative work.”92 It was not until after 1926 that the Prohibition Bureau 
became subject to civil service testing. When active Prohibition agents were subjected to
88 The majority of th e agen ts in 1920 (839 o f 943) w ere paid b etw een  $1 ,200  and $2 ,000  per annum. 
NCLOE, Report, 12, 16. The N ew  York Police Departm ent, also with a reputation for corruption, paid its 
officers an average annual salary o f $1 ,900 . Lemer, Dry M anhattan , 82.
89 Allen, Only Yesterday, 216.
91 NCLOE, Report, 12. In 1926, George W ickersham testified  to  th e S enate C om m ittee that "the character
of the personnel in m any resp ects w as very undesirable." S enate C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, 
Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcement, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., 1930, 211, 3.
92 NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2, 3 3 n l0 .
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9 3  i •their first civil service exam, 70 percent of the examinees flunked. Prior to that time 
cronyism placed men in positions for which they were unqualified. Lemer described 
some of the first appointees in New York City as “dishwashers, baseball players, boxing 
managers, shopkeepers, and returning veterans.”94 These agents obtained their positions 
through their political connections, as a reward for service to the party. Others were 
given positions became of their dedication to the temperance movement. Henry S. 
Dennison, Wickersham Committee member, characterized these appointees as “a 
combination of fanatics and crooks.”95 Agents Izzy Einstein and Moe Smith arrested 
five-thousand violators in the five years they worked, a full fifth of the prohibition cases 
prosecuted in New York City up to 1926, yet they were fired because they were making 
their coworkers look incompetent.96
That the agents were underpaid and underqualified contributed to corruption 
within the Bureau. George Wickersham commented, to a 1926 Senate Committee 
investigating law enforcement: “When you.. .[consider] that the extraordinary temptation 
to which very ordinary men, men of very ordinary caliber, put into positions for which 
they had no previous training, were subjected, I think it is a remarkable thing not so much
Q O
that there was corruption, but that there was any limit to the corruption.” A culture of 
graft surrounded all of Prohibition enforcement. The agents saw their quarries living a 
lifestyle that made their already low government pay seem paltry. A police officer or
93 Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 279. The Prohibition Bureau did not require civil service exam inations until June 
4 ,1 9 2 7 . Only 4 ,504  p assed  th e exam ination, approxim ately one-third o f th o se  taking it. Of th ese , 2 ,526  
w ere declared ineligible for character, personality or fitness. (NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2, 17-28, 228).
94 Lerner, Dry M anhattan , 66.
95 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 61.
96 Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 294-295 . Einstein and Smith w ere also accused  of flagrant Constitutional
violations, but this w as not th e  reason for their dism issal. Coffey, The Long Thirst, 99.
98 Senate C om m ittee on th e  Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcement, 10-11.
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Prohibition agent could increase their income by 25 percent by collecting only five 
dollars a week from just one person or establishment. The actual graft amounts collected 
were often far more. In New York City, the going rate for tipping off a liquor dealer or 
saloon owner was from fifty dollars to five hundred dollars." In Philadelphia, policemen 
were paid monthly “salaries” by the liquor interests dependent on their rank: seventy- 
five dollars to district captains, fifty dollars to district detectives, and twenty-five dollars 
to street sergeants.100 If the payment was made to ignore a large-scale transaction the 
amount offered could be 20,000 dollars or more.101 One Agent Kerrigan estimated that 
an agent could easily increase his income to between 40,000 and 50,000 dollars a year.102 
The temptation was too much for many to withstand, as Wickersham noted to the Senate 
Committee: “It is putting an undue strain on an every-day sort of individual to put him in 
a position where he has got a salary large enough to enable him to live with a family in 
ordinarily decent circumstances and expose him to the temptation that by turning his back 
he can obtain a sum large enough to keep him in comfort.”103
Just because the temptation existed, it doesn’t necessarily mean that agents were 
corrupted. But the records of the Prohibition Bureau prove otherwise. Edward Behr, in 
Prohibition: Thirteen Years that Changed America, broke down the corruption 
numerically: between 1920 and 1930, some 11,926 agents (out of a force of 17,816) were 
‘separated without prejudice’ [from the Bureau] because their criminal involvement could 
not be proved, and another 1,587 were ‘dismissed with cause.’”104 Tip offs to criminals
99 Lerner, Dry M anhattan , 68, 82.
100 NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 5, 205.
101 Lerner, Dry M anhattan, 69.
102 Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 277.
103 Senate C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcement, 10-11.
104 Behr, Prohibition, 153.
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and speakeasy owners were so common in the New York City office of the Bureau, that it 
cut its outgoing telephone service when a raid was about to be initiated “to stop tips from 
being phoned out by agents on the take.”105 John Kobler, in Ardent Spirits: The Rise and 
Fall o f  Prohibition, noted that, from 1920-1930, almost 12 percent of persons who 
worked for the bureau were dismissed for cause.106
Mabel Walker Willebrandt, an Assistant Attorney General for the United States 
from 1921 to 1929, was in a unique position to observe the enforcement of the Volstead 
Act. After she left office, she wrote The Inside o f Prohibition as a way to convey to the 
public her perspective on the ineffectiveness of enforcement. She wrote of the problems 
in enforcement due in part to the corruption within the Prohibition Bureau: “In the six 
years from 1920 to 1926 more than seven hundred and fifty prohibition agents were 
dismissed from the force for delinquency or misconduct. Among the charges which were 
brought were extortion, bribery, solicitation of money, illegal disposition of liquor or 
other property, intoxication, assault, the making of false reports, and theft. Sixty-one 
other officers and employees were dismissed for acts of collusion or conspiracy to violate
t  r\n
the very law they had sworn to protect!” The Senate noted in 1931 that corruption was 
improved over time by the “continuous sifting out” of corrupt agents, “giving the 
employees a better status under the civil service,” and “by giving them better
1 ORcompensation.” But the ineffectiveness that accompanied the corruption damaged the 
public reputation of the Bureau early in Prohibition; improvement could not change the 
lingering impression that the Bureau was corrupt, inefficient, and ineffective.
105 Lerner, Dry M anhattan , 68, 69.
106 Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 277.
107 M abel Walker W illebrant, The Inside o f Prohibition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1929) 111.
108 Sen ate C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcement, 10.
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There are many individual instances of shocking corruption that contributed to 
this impression. A Philadelphia Prohibition director, in 1921, helped remove seven 
hundred thousand gallons of whiskey, with a street value of four million dollars, from 
government-bonded warehouses. His case was discharged when the evidence 
disappeared.109 A congressman in Pittsburgh served a jail sentence for allowing four 
thousand cases of bonded whiskey to fall into the hands of bootleggers. He was reelected 
with the help of the Anti-Saloon League because of his dry voting record.110 A federal 
grand jury in Pittsburgh indicted: two police magistrates, two legislators, five ward 
chairmen, the superintendant of police, fourteen police inspectors, five patrolmen and one 
constable.111 Lemer chronicles other instances: the Bureau’s “administrator of Chicago 
and its chief agent in 1923; its director for Ohio in 1925; in 1927 its former administrator 
of Buffalo, his former assistant, and several agents active and retired; its deputy 
administrator of Fayetteville, North Carolina, and six agents, its former chief of the New
i 1
York Druggist Permit Division.” While anecdotal, these instances make clear that 
corruption ran throughout the Bureau -  from agent, to administrator, to director.
The difficulty of the job, the low pay, the corruption -  all of this contributed to the 
excessive amount of turnover in the Prohibition Bureau. Between 1920 and 1925 the
1 1 o
lowest rate of turnover was 14.83 percent of personnel; the highest was 76.15 percent.
The Wickersham Commission found that “no organization could function efficiently and
109 Behr, Prohibition, 153.
110 Behr, Prohibition, 154.
111 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 211-2.
112Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 274..
113 NCLOE, Report, 16. NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 206. The exact num bers o f turnover are: 1921 -  
74.55%; 1922 -  47.36%; 1923 -  47.69% , and 1924 -  28.80%. (NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 206). Compare 
this with th e 3% turnover in th e Secret Service in 1929-1930. In th e sam e year th e  Prohibition Bureau had 
a turnover of 28.01%  (NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 206, 213); NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 216-219.
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harmoniously in such a state of upheaval, with its leadership continually shifting and its 
plan of field organization subject to constant revision.”114 For comparison, in 1929-1930 
the Prohibition Bureau had a turnover of 28.01 percent, while the Secret Service was 3 
percent in the same year and post-office inspectors 2.47 percent.115
The ineffectiveness of the Bureau caused by corruption was compounded by the 
lack of assistance from other law enforcement agencies. There was an expectation at the 
outset that the Bureau agents would be helped in their monumental task by “local law 
enforcement agencies, the Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, and other 
agencies.”116 The help that Congress had predicted or expected when it enacted Volstead 
was not forthcoming. Federal agencies that were expected to cooperate were specifically 
the Coast Guard, Customs, and the Department of Justice. The first two were “organized 
for a totally different purpose from the prevention of the inflow of liquor... and not
• * 117anxious to be drawn into the problem of prohibition.” Allen describes these agencies’
1 1 8assistance as “unenthusiastic.” The Department of Justice was obligated to prosecute 
these cases investigated by the Bureau, but was continually frustrated in its efforts to 
secure convictions. The corruption in the Bureau and illegal methods used by agents led 
to evidence being excluded, witnesses unable to testify, and the impeachment of 
testimony by untrustworthy Bureau agents. The Bureau agents rendered many cases 
unwinnable.
The Coast Guard had the same issues of graft that seemed to surround everything 
to do with Prohibition. Coast Guard captain Frank J. Stuart was paid two thousand
114 NCLOE, Report, 16, 64, 97.
115 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 206, 213.
116 Lerner, Dry M anhattan , 65. Allen, Only Yesterday,218.
117 Senate C om m ittee on th e  Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcement, 12.
118 Allen, Only Yesterday, 217-218.
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dollars for letting liquor boats land near Montauk.119 The Coast Guard struggled to 
enforce Prohibition laws. International maritime law set a three-mile boundary: outside 
of this the Coast Guard did not have jurisdiction over a vessel, unless that ship was in
ioncontact with shore. Generally this meant that unless the Coast Guard actually saw 
small boats pulling up to the large ships that were essentially floating warehouses, they 
did not have jurisdiction to board the vessel, impound it, or seize the cargo. In addition, 
most of the smaller boats that carried the alcohol to shore were faster than the Coast 
Guard ships, with locally experienced captains that could, given a small headstart, easily 
outrun the Coast Guard. As late as 1931, government officials were noticing the 
underequipped Coast Guard vessels, recommending an “increase in mechanical 
equipment such as: (a) Radios for the interception of the smugglers’ messages, and (b) 
airplanes for scouting purposes;” they also recommended “faster boats” and silencing 
devices.” 121
Like the Prohibition Bureau, Customs officials were woefully understaffed to deal 
with importation of liquor. In 1926, Customs had only one hundred seventy patrolmen 
for the entire length of the land borders with Canada and Mexico.122 These agents were 
expected to halt what the Department of Commerce estimated was forty million dollars 
worth of liquor entering the country.123 General Lincoln C. Andrews, appointed
119 Behr, Prohibition, 143.
120 This law changed to  approxim ately tw elve to  tw en ty  m iles offshore, or an hour's sail. Jam es Barbican, 
Confessions o f a Rum-Runner (Mystic, CT: Flat Hammock Press, 2007) 125. For m ore on Rum Row and the  
Coast Guard, s e e  Harold W alters, Smugglers o f Spirits: Prohibition and the Coast Guard Patrol (Mystic, CT: 
Flat Hammock Press, 2007  and Robert Carse, Rum Row: The Liquor Fleet that Fueled the Roaring Twenties 
(Mystic, CT: Flat Hammock Press, 2007). For m ore on Rum Row generally, se e  Alastair Moray, The Diary 
o f a Rum-Runner (M ystic, CT: Flat Hammock Press, 2007) and Frederic F. Van d e W ater, The Real McCoy 
(Mystic, CT: Flat Hammock Press, 2007).
121 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 1 8 6 ,1 8 9 .
122 NCLOE, Report, 13-14.
123 Allen, Only Yesterday, 217-218.
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Assistant Secretary of the Treasury assigned in 1925 to supervise Customs, Coast Guard, 
and Prohibition, estimated that he would need a force of at least 1,500 agents to 
adequately patrol both borders.124 And, again, corruption was a problem. United States 
Attorney John R. Watkins led a 1931 investigation into Customs officials in Detroit that 
was expected to bring indictments against one hundred Customs agents. This had 
happened before in Detroit, when in one year 175 men were fired. There were only 129 
inspectors working in Detroit; this was a turnover of more than 135 percent. Watkins 
estimated that one half of the liquor smuggled from Canada was done so with the help of 
Customs inspectors, who were collecting approximately 1,700 dollars per month in 
bribes. 126
As one particular example of non-cooperation, in Florida, there were forty-four 
fruit fly quarantine stations, all federal, though often operated by state officials. All 
vehicles that passed through the station were searched for fruit that might carry the 
Mediterranean fruit fly out of Florida. Customs officials “reported instances of car 
seizures, involving large quantities of contraband [liquor] that had been previously
* joosearched and passed with a Government seal by fruit-fly inspectors.” Here, it would 
have been quite simple and effective for the quarantine stations to arrest and/or seize the 
liquor in transport, but it was not done.
Before the Prohibition Bureau was relocated to the Department of Justice, the 
Treasury Department investigated offenses and the Department of Justice prosecuted the 
offenders. Attorney General Mitchell pushed for the move, saying that it would “make a
^  NCLOE, Report, 13-14.
126 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 213-4. 
128 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 4, 120.
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129closer coordination between the detection and the prosecution” of these offenses. 
Prohibition agents would pursue a criminal with little thought of ensuring a successful 
prosecution. They were, as already noted, untrained. Cases were often dismissed 
because the agents did not follow Constitutional procedures in investigating and arresting 
violators.130 Lemer writes of one effect of this misconduct: “Any time an arresting 
police officer or Prohibition agent was dismissed from the force, prosecutors quickly 
dropped all pending cases involving the implicated officer... The United States 
Attorney’s office was forced to dismiss cases because evidence had been improperly or 
illegally seized, or, on occasion, because evidence and case files had disappeared from 
the Bureau of Prohibition headquarters.”131 The Department of Justice and the federal 
court system felt the heavy burden of the Prohibition law. If every violator “arrested 
during a single month... demanded a jury trial, every federal judge available for 
prohibition cases would be occupied for a year.”132 Even though this scenario did not 
actually occur, the case load nevertheless began to overwhelm the federal courts.
Volstead violations were 65 percent of the federal cases heard in the 1920s. In 1921, the 
federal courts handled 29,114 cases of prohibition violation. In 1932, it was 65,960. By 
1930, 49 percent o f federal prisoners were there for Volstead violations; up from 7 
percent in the early 1920s.134 Prosecutors often used their discretion to not take cases to
129 S enate C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcement, 31.
130 Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition, 35.
131 Lerner, Dry M anhattan , 91. S ee also, Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition, 35.
132 Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 283.
134 Kyvig, Daily Life, 178.
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trial that they deemed trivial or likely unwinnable because of search and seizure issues or
I O C
suggestions of corruption.
Successful enforcement of Prohibition also required coordination with foreign 
nations. Prior to Prohibition, Great Britain and Canada had exported substantial amounts 
of alcohol to the United States. It was not in their best financial interest to cease 
exportation and lose the profits from American purchasers, but politically it was essential 
to maintain at least an appearance of respect for American laws. British alcohol was 
rerouted to the Bahamas or Bermuda or Canada. These Caribbean island nations, and 
some Canadian islands like St. Pierre and Miquelon, suddenly became warehouses for 
British liquor ultimately destined for the United States. From there, the liquor was 
transported to Florida or the infamous Rum Row off the Eastern seaboard of the United 
States and then onto American shores. Captain Bunting, a rumrunner operating out of 
Nassau, described the system: “We get the stuff shipped out from England to Nassau in 
the ordinary way. It is paid for and the Bahamas Government gets the duty it imposes. 
We employ labour in the island and we have brought prosperity to a poverty-stricken 
place. We unload it from the big boats and load it up again on rum-runners like mine. It 
goes up off the American coast, breaking no American or English law, for we keep in
100
international waters.” Indeed, many Bahamians became wealthy from American
135 Lerner, Dry M anhattan , 87. The plea bargain system  becam e a m ainstay o f th e federal courts during 
Prohibition. Judges w ould often  have "bargain days" to  help clear their dockets w h ere defen dan ts could
plead guilty, pay a fine, and avoid jail tim e, Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 283.
135 For information on Great Britain, th e  Bahamas, and Prohibition, s e e  Gertrude "Cleo" Lythgoe, The 
Bahama Queen: Prohibition's Daring Beauty (Mystic, CT: Flat Hammock Press, 2007. Also about the  
Bahamas, and including inform ation on St. Pierre, is H. De W inton Wigley, With the Whiskey Smugglers in 
Gertrude "Cleo" Lythgoe, The Bahama Queen: Prohibition's Daring Beauty (Mystic, CT: Flat Hammock 
Press, 2007). Originally published by Daily N ew s Ltd, London, in 1923. For th e e ffec ts  o f th e  eighteenth  
am en dm en t on diplom acy with Great Britain, s e e  Lawrence Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy: The United States, 
Great Britain, and Prohibition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefied Publishers, 2008).
138 Wigley, With the Whiskey Smugglers, in Lythgoe, The Bahama Queen, 31.
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Prohibition. Individuals could make vast fortunes in a short amount of time -  Roland T. 
Symmonette made 1 million dollars in three years; this rumrunner became the first 
Bahamian premier in 1964. The Bahamian government also reaped the benefits: revenue 
from liquor imports and re-exports went from 81,049 pounds in 1919 to 1,065,899 
pounds in 1923.139 According to Daniel Okrent, this revenue “brought Nassauvians into 
the twentieth century. After the completion of a sewage system, a 2,300-volt generator, a 
modem wharf..., a newly dredged harbor, and miles of resurfaced roads and streets.. 
the colony’s British governor, Sir Bede Clifford, said it would be appropriate to erect 
near the statues of Christopher Columbus and Queen Victoria a third one: a monument to 
Andrew J. Volstead.”140
Great Britain also continued to export to Canada, where the liquor was redirected 
to American buyers. How this liquor and Canadian alcohol reached the United States 
depended upon the law in the particular Canadian province where the alcohol was held. 
Canada was experimenting with legislating control of alcohol contemporaneously with 
the United States. Instead of national prohibition, Canada developed a system like the 
local option laws that had preceded Prohibition in the United States, whereby each 
province voted on its own legislative schema. Two territories, Prince Edward Island and 
Nova Scotia, were under self-imposed Prohibition. In the other seven, government 
controlled the sale of alcohol. In Saskatchewan, Ontario, and New Brunswick the 
government maintained a monopoly on the sale of all alcohol -  “sold only in sealed 
packages at Government stores and may not be consumed in a public place.” British 
Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec had the same system for hard liquor but not
139 Michael Craton and Gail Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History o f The Bahamian People, vol. 2 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1998) 240, 238.
140 Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall o f Prohibition (New York: Scribner, 2010) 160.
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beer or wine, which was purchased by the glass at licensed taverns, beer parlors or (in 
Quebec) shops.141 British Columbia allowed, until 1928, for private importation.143 
There was no restriction in Canadian law on selling liquor to persons within the United 
States. The only impediment to exporting to the United States was the government 
excise tax, and an a 20 dollar surcharge imposed on alcohol destined for the United 
States. According to Canadian records, in 1921 whiskey exports to the United States 
were 8,335 gallons; by 1928, whiskey exports had reached 1,169,002 gallons.145 In 1921, 
195,498 gallons of malt liquor were exported to the United States; in 1927, the total was 
3,888,815 gallons.146 Foreign-made liquors were also re-exported from Canada to the 
United States. In 1920, only 127 gallons of spirits were re-exported; in 1928, it was 
243,305 gallons.147 In 1919 the value of all imported liquor was 295,502 dollars. By 
1923, it was 12,931,819 dollars. And in 1929, 38,311,336 dollars.148 The Canadian 
government benefited financially from both the importation and exportation of alcohol.
In 1918 the combined excise and customs duties on alcohol netted the Canadian 
government 15,617,190; by 1928 it was 49,805,291.149 These numbers only account for 
the alcohol tracked by customs via the twenty-dollar surcharge.150 Provincially, British 
Columbia made 294,969 dollars in 1919, but 2,765,009 dollars in 1928. By 1928,
Quebec and Ontario were making over 7 and 8 million dollars, respectively.151 As for re­
exports, in 1920 Canada re-exported 4,179 gallons of liquor, 18 gallons of malt beverage,
141 NCLOE, Enforcement vol. 1, 373.
143 NCLOE, Enforcement vol. 1, 434.
145 NCLOE, Enforcement vol. 5, 221.
145 NCLOE, Enforcement vol. 5, 221.
147 NCLOE, Enforcement vol. 5, 246.
148 NCLOE, Enforcement vol. 1, 378-9.
149 NCLOE, Enforcement vol. 1, 379.
150 Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 254.
151 NCLOE, Enforcement vol. 1, 379.
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and 641 gallons of wine. In 1928, it re-exported 247,506 gallons of liquor, 634 gallons of
i co
malt beverages, and 150,056 gallons of wine.
Canadian Customs officials did share information with their American 
counterparts about these shipments, and the transfer of information increased as 
politicians negotiated heightened assistance.153 Still, many bootleggers would avoid the 
surcharge by forging shipping documents. And often the information arrived in the 
United States too late to arrest the importers.154 Roy Haynes, Prohibition Commissioner, 
complained that their cargo was often “consigned to Mexican ports which it never 
reaches, surreptitiously landed on the coast of Washington, Oregon, and California.”155 
These shipments were not disclosed to officials in the United States, as they were, at least 
on paper, not destined for American customers. This amounted to a significant amount of 
the traffic from Canada. David Kyvig estimated that one million gallons of Canadian 
liquor came into America each year from 1920-1930 -  80 percent of Canada’s 
production.156
Not only were Prohibition agents expected to coordinate with the federal agencies 
and foreign nations, in order to be effective they had to coordinate with state apparatuses.
152 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 1, 414.
153 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 1, 229-285  ("Correspondence b etw een  th e G overnm ents o f Canada and the  
United States relative to  com m ercial sm uggling across the border").
154 In 1925 Canada and M exico signed agreem en ts that required them  to  inform American Customs agents  
of any shipm ents bound for the United States. Kobler, Ardent Spirits, 254.
155 Roy A. Haynes, Prohibition Inside Out (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1923) 149. He described the  
procedure: "It may be ordered at a brewery or distillery and consigned  'for export' to  a certain [fictitious] 
man in the United States. A big bootlegger... goes in person to  the brew ery or distillery, places the order, 
nam es the con signees, and even  th e  pow er boats on which th e  liquor is to  be shipped...Paym ent may be 
m ade either there or on delivery at th e wharves, but usually is m ade at th e  tim e th e order is placed. All 
th e form alities o f export are a tten d ed  to , including th e  issuance o f insurance papers... Clearance papers 
are m ade out in due form, and approved by Canadian custom s officials. Clearance fee s  are paid by each  
small liquor boat in accordance with Canadian laws, and the revenue, from th e se  fe e s  and from taxation  
on liquor sales, is considerable." Haynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 90-91.
156 Kyvig, Repealing N ational Prohibition, 21.
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By 1929 there was no state legislation enforcing Prohibition in New York, Nevada, 
Montana, Wisconsin, and Maryland. Maryland had never enacted any state enforcement 
statute. Illinois residents twice voted in referendums to repeal its state laws, but the
• i  cn t
Illinois Senate prevented repeal. Governor Albert C. Ritchie, of Maryland, expressed 
the frustrations of these state governments: “The eighteenth amendment gives the 
Federal Government and the several States concurrent power to enforce it by appropriate 
legislation. Some contend very earnestly that this imposes a concurrent obligation to 
enforce, —that the power implies the duty.” He went on to explain Maryland’s position on 
the matter: “Federal officials are bound to enforce Federal laws and State officials are 
bound to enforce State laws, but neither Nation nor State is bound to enforce the laws of 
the other... We are under no duty to help and relieve the Federal government of the 
burdens and cost it has assumed under the Volstead law by making that law a Maryland 
measure and setting up our own State machinery to enforce it, and thus making the
• 1 S 8people of Maryland share its burdens and its costs; and we decline to do it.” The 
refusal to enact state laws or to use state officers to enforce federal laws was a matter of 
federalism. But it was also a matter of economics. Prior to Prohibition, revenue from 
liquor taxes had, for most city and state governments, amounted to a significant portion 
of their operating budget.160 State and city governments resented using their funds to 
enforce Prohibition and prosecute violators, when they had lost such a significant portion
157 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 163-164. Both Illinois referendum  passed  with over 60  percent in favor of 
rem oving sta te  prohibition laws.
158 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 264. For a similar rationale for th e repeal in New York o f th e  Mullen-Gage
law in 1923, s e e  Kyvig, Repealing N ational Prohibition, 55-58.
160 Leslie Gordon, in 1930, w rote of th e econom ics o f repeal. "If th e liquor now  sold by bootleggers was 
legally sold, regulated, and taxed, th e  excise incom e w ould pay th e interest on th e entire local and 
national bonded in debted ness and leave m ore than $200 ,000  for other urgently n eed ed  purposes." The 
New Crusade (Cleveland, 1932) xxi-xxii, cited in Engelwood, "Organized Thirst," in Alcohol, Reform and 
Society, Jack S. Blocker, Jr., ed ., 183.
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of their operating expenses when Volstead was passed. Prohibition restricted federal 
revenue as well. From 1873 to 1917, the revenue on spirits was 23 percent of the 
nation’s tax receipts.161 As an indication, the first six months of 1933 brought the federal
* • • 1 fcf)government 54.1 million dollars in revenue from beer alone. On the state level, New 
York lost 22.6 million dollars it collected under liquor taxes, more than a quarter of the 
state budget.163 Locally, as an example, Atlanta’s liquor tax generated 48.6 percent of its 
revenue before it instituted Prohibition.164 Washington State, when it began collecting 
revenue after Prohibition, amassed 8.6 million dollars in revenue. The same year, 1936, 
total revenue from state taxes was 50 million dollars.165 Many localities refused to allow 
Prohibition to drain their already limited resources; only eighteen states allocated any 
money at all to enforcement state or national Prohibition laws. “By 1927 their [these 
state governments’] financial contribution to the cause was about one-eighth of the sum 
they spent enforcing their own fish and game laws.”166
Even in those states that had local legislation obligating state and local officers to 
enforce prohibition, cooperation was often not forthcoming or logistically possible. For 
the same economic reasons that some states opted out of Prohibition, local enforcement 
agencies often could not afford time-consuming and expensive investigations of liquor 
trafficking. Local officers were a part of the community in which they worked, and 
would often, according to Nelson Johnson, “obstruct federal officials attempting to secure
161 Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment: Temperance Reform, Legal Culture, and the 
Polity, 1880-1920  (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1995) 46, citing Tun-Yuan Hu, The Liquor 
Tax in the United States, 1791-1947, Columbia University M onographs in Public Finance and National 
Incom e, no. I (New York: Graduate School o f Business, Columbia University, 1951) en d piece.
162 Ogle, Ambitious Brew, 202.
163 Lerner, Dry M anhattan , 51.
154 Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment, 97, citing James M. Wright, The License System o f the City 
o f A tlanta  (n.p.: Harper Printer Co., 1964) 237.
155 Clark, The Dry Years, 244.
166 Rose, American Women and the Repeal o f Prohibition, 47. Allen, Only Yesterday, 218.
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compliance with Prohibition.”167 They had no interest in arresting their family and 
friends for minor violations of the prohibition laws. Sometimes these local officers were 
violating Volstead themselves. Corruption was also common with state and local 
officials. Joseph Blasey, International Secretary Treasurer of the Journeyman 
Stonecutters’ Association of North America, summed up what he considered the 
“workingman’s view” of the situation. “Most of these [places where liquors can be 
purchased] are running without interference by the police, which would lead one to 
believe that they are getting protection in some way. If the civilian population knows of
these conditions and where these speak-easies are, surely it can not be said that the police
• 1and other authorities do not know of them and where they are located.” The public
witnessed blatant violations of the Volstead Act, and both the federal agents and local 
enforcement officials did not investigate and prosecute offenders. To many it seemed 
that Volstead’s failure did not stem from an inability to enforce the law.
Those officials, local, state, or federal, who did try to enforce the law faced the 
burgeoning business of crime. The Volstead Act created an opportunity for criminals 
already active in gambling, prostitution, and racketeering to become quickly and 
immensely wealthy. Prohibition Commissioner Roy Haynes entitled the eighth chapter 
of Prohibition Inside Out “Enforcement and the Big Violator.” He describes the illicit 
liquor organizations as “aping” legitimate business.170 Lynn Dumenil, in Modern 
Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s, likened the bootleggers’ operations 
to the “output system” of “early industrial manufacturers” -  they “organized networks of
167 Nelson Johnson, Boardwalk Empire: The Birth, High Times, and Corruption o f Atlantic City (M edford, NJ: 
M edford Press, 2002) 87.
168 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3, 288-289.
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171
home stills as part of their production and distribution system.” Whether their method 
was to get liquor off the floating warehouses of Rum Row on the east coast, over the 
Canadian border at Detroit or other points of entry, across the waterways separating 
Canada and the United States, or across the border with Mexico, criminals used existing 
drug networks and created new networks to transport liquor into and around the country. 
Criminal enterprises also produced and distributed domestic liquors and beers. Doing so 
required physical space and equipment, trucks for transport, and many employees. Many 
of these organizations kept careful records, even hiring accountants and lawyers. Often it 
was these records that led to successful prosecution.
Today a lawful business will take into account the risks and costs inherent in its 
operation, mostly by taking out insurance policies to help defray the costs of litigation. 
The criminal enterprises of the Prohibition era operated will full knowledge that their 
products might be seized by the government. This was factored into their purchasing, 
pricing, and planning. The Wickersham Commission noted that these syndications are 
“not deterred by the occasional seizure of a carload of liquor or confiscation of a boat or 
truck. The business has been established on the basis of a definite risk of seizure.” 172 
Even the prospect of being fined or sent to prison was a calculated risk. Haynes wrote 
that “fines are considered merely an element of business expense. Imprisonment, 
although inconvenient, is not regarded by some as sufficient to warrant passing up a
• 1 H'Xfortune which will await them when the prison sentence is over.” This ability to 
absorb loss and still be profitable and operational is part of what made these criminal 
enterprises difficult to shut down for even the most honest, well-trained enforcement
171 Dumenil, M odern Temper, 233.
172 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 151.
1 73
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agent. And this organization and seeming impenetrability is what inspired federal agents
to use techniques like wiretapping.
The inadequacy of the federal machinery that existed to enforce Prohibition and
the corruption endemic to the Prohibition Bureau created near chaos. Lack of training,
lack of funding, lack of cooperation from other federal agencies, states, and countries -
these factors led Prohibition agents, whether in good faith or not, to try new techniques
and often act overzealously to investigate .and arrest these seemingly well-organized
violators of the Volstead Act.
These investigative and enforcement methods were then tested by the Supreme
Court, which issued a series of opinions that transformed the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. Governor Albert C. Ritchie of Maryland essentially catalogued the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions during Prohibition:
Our houses are no longer our castles... we can be halted and searched as 
we go about our lawful adventures, and can be hectored, browbeaten and even 
cold-bloodedly shot down, - all in the name of the law... If all this is not the 
nullification of supposedly inalienable rights and liberties, what is?210
He saw each of these decisions as an infringement on liberty, as did the public. Each
decision brought the judiciary closer to acknowledging that there was a line at which the
government should not intrude into a citizen’s personal life or personal space -  that the
Constitution grants a right to privacy. During Prohibition the Court never actually
acknowledged this right. It consistently found that the government had not violated the 
211Fourth Amendment. The cases decided under the Fourth Amendment increasingly 
circumscribed individual citizens’ rights and gave federal agents more leeway. Supreme
210 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 270.
211 An actual right to  privacy w as not acknow ledged by the Court until 1965, w ith its decision in Griswaid 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479  (1965).
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Court Justices began, in Olmstead, to question what the Fourth Amendment was meant to 
protect. In his dissent, Brandeis articulates for the first time, with three of his brethren 
concurring, that the Fourth Amendment implicates more than the protection of physical 
places, tangible objects, and the corpus of a person. He posited that the Fourth 
Amendment should guarantee the individual the right to be let alone.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”212 Prior to Prohibition, jurisprudence related to 
this Amendment was limited to a few cases. Boyd v. United States, decided in 1886, was 
the leading case that extended Fourth Amendment protection to a government action that 
did not constitute physically entering a property. The government mandated by statute 
that a suspect provide certain paperwork to the government. This paperwork, if produced 
by the suspect, would incriminate that suspect. The Supreme Court held that this demand 
was a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the 
production of the paperwork forced the suspect to incriminate himself, in violation of the 
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. In future cases, the government would have 
to produce a warrant to search for that paperwork. Just because the government did not 
physically enter the office where the paperwork was located, did not mean that no search 
occurred. In 1914, in Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the admittance 
into evidence of papers and records seized from a defendant’s house when there was no 
arrest warrant for that defendant or search warrant for the premises and no permission
212 U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
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given to the officers to enter was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This is known as 
the “exclusionary rule:” the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use in trial of evidence that 
was obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure. In 1920, Silverthorne Lumber 
Company v. United States extended the Fourth Amendment protections to corporations 
and their offices, papers, and effects. From these cases the Court crafted its opinions in 
Olmstead and the other cases decided during Prohibition. During Prohibition, the Court 
in effect created an entire field in Constitutional doctrine.
Kenneth Murchison characterized the years from 1920-1929 as “A Doctrinal 
Explosion” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, with the Court issuing twenty opinions 
that addressed Fourth Amendment concerns during the first ten years of Prohibition. 
Murchison found that throughout Prohibition the Court increasingly “divided over 
controversial enforcement practices but [was] still willing to tolerate the intrusive 
practices necessary to catch serious violators.”213 Kyvig found that, during the 1920s, the 
“Court’s opinions substantially strengthened the machinery for enforcing law and order... 
[creating] the image of a government prepared to engage in more aggressive and intrusive 
policing practices than ever before.” This was done specifically to enforce the 
Prohibition law.214
The first Prohibition-era case that addressed Fourth Amendment issues was 
Gouled v. United States (1921), in which the Justices opined that the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments are to be liberally construed by the courts. An intelligence officer 
entered Gouled’s house pretending it was a social call. He then took papers from the 
house without Gouled’s knowledge or permission. In its decision, the Court prohibited
213 Murchison, Forgotten Influence, 73.
214 Kyvig, Repealing, 35.
215 Gouled v. United States 255 U.S. 298, 303 (1921).
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federal officers from entering and searching a premises by “stealth, through social
216acquaintance, or the guise of a business call” if they did not have a warrant. It also
217 •excluded from trial any evidence obtained in this manner. While Gouled was not a 
Prohibition case, it was a prelude to the cases decided under the Fourth Amendment in 
the context of investigating and enforcing Prohibition laws. The Court set a precedent 
that, at least in theory, it would interpret the Fourth Amendment liberally “to prevent 
stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of the rights secured by them [the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments], by imperceptible practice of the courts or by well 
intentioned, but mistakenly overzealous, executive officers.” The Court acknowledged 
that there was unlimited potential for the Fourth Amendment to limit citizens’ rights. 
Throughout the 1920s, the Court repeatedly interpreted the Amendment in favor of law 
enforcement and not the people, specifying various exceptions to the warrant requirement 
and limiting the physical and metaphorical reach of the Amendment’s protection.
The next case in which the Court tackled the Fourth Amendment was Hester v. 
United States. In 1924 the Court defined the “open fields” surrounding a house as exempt 
from the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The Bureau agents positioned 
themselves on land about one hundred yards from the Hester house. From this vantage 
point, they observed a man drive toward the house. They then saw-Hester come outside 
and give the man a bottle. The agents sounded the alarm, and the man threw aside the 
bottle. The agents arrested Hester. The Court was unanimous in its opinion that the 
possibility that the agents had trespassed on Hester’s land did not implicate the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The agents’ actions did not amount to a search,
215 Gouled v. U.S. 255 U.S. 298, at 305.
217 Gouled v. U.S. 255 U.S. 298, at 306.
218 Gouled v. U.S. 255 U.S. 298 at 304.
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and the confiscation of the containers was not a seizure, as they were discarded. Here the 
Court limited the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the actual building, and not to
<■} 1 Q
the entire property owned by the defendant.
In 1925’s Carroll v. United States, the Court outlined an automobile exception to
990the warrant requirement which has survived to the present day. Agents stopped and 
searched a vehicle driven by persons they suspected were illegally transporting alcohol 
from Detroit. After tearing back a seat cushion, agents found sixty-eight cases of liquor. 
The whiskey was seized and the suspects arrested. Chief Justice Taft noted the 
impracticality of securing a warrant before the vehicle moved. The Court granted an 
exception to the warrant requirement in cases where officers “have reasonable or 
probable cause for believing that the automobile has contraband.” While Carroll does 
create an exception to the warrant requirement, giving enforcement officers the ability to 
search and seize under new circumstances, it also creates an expectation of privacy in 
one’s automobile. Before officers make a warrantless search or seizure of an automobile, 
they must have “reasonable or probably cause” that contraband goods are inside. The 
search cannot be made unless the officer can justify his reasons for searching that 
automobile at that time.
Part of the argument rejected by the Court in Carroll was that the search of the 
vehicle fell under the “search-incident-to-arresf ’ exception to the warrant requirement 
that had already been drawn by the Court. This exception (still a part of Fourth
219 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). The "curtilage," or area im m ediately surrounding a 
structure like a house, is p rotected  by th e  Fourth A m endm ent. In th e majority opinion in the Olmstead 
case, th e Court referenced  this protection , but th e Court did not legally define curtilage until 1987 in 
United States v. Dunn, 480  U.S. 294 (1987).
220 The exception  also applies to  "a search o f a ship, m otor boat, or w agon for contraband good s w here it 
is not practicable to  secu re a warrant b ecau se th e  vehicle can be quickly m oved." Carroll v. United States 
267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925).
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Amendment law) allows an officer to arrest a suspect and search the suspect and the. area
within his immediate control, if the officer has witnessed the suspect committing a crime.
Since the officers did not stop the vehicle because they had witnessed a known violation
of the law, but stopped it because of a reasonable suspicion, the search was not incident
to the arrest; the arrest took place after the search. The Court, in a 1925 narcotics case,
did not extend the search-incident-to arrest-exception to the premises of a defendant if the
defendant was not arrested in that premises. Agnello was arrested several blocks for
from his home. After the arrest, officers searched his home and seized evidence. In this
situation, the Fourth Amendment protections require the officers to get a search warrant 
221for the residence.
In Marron v. United States, another Prohibition case decided in 1927, the Court 
refined the search-incident-to-arrest exception further. A warrant was issued to search a 
property leased by Marron, specifying that the officers were looking for “intoxicating 
liquors and articles for their manufacture.” When agents searched the premises, several 
persons were “being furnished intoxicating liquors.” The person supplying the liquor 
was arrested. The agents conducted their search, seizing items specified in the warrant. 
They also seized a business ledger that they had discovered in a closet. The Court was 
very clear that the search warrant alone did not give the agents authorization to seize the 
ledger, as it was not specified in that warrant. However, the arrest for a crime committed 
in the presence of the agents allowed a search of the premises “to find and seize the 
things used to carry on a criminal enterprise.” Agents were entitled to search “all parts 
of the premises used for the illegal purpose,” so long as the area was in the “immediate 
possession and control” of the person arrested. Again, the Court circumscribed some
221 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
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rights while affirming others. A person’s home could be thoroughly searched, if the 
homeowner was arrested on the premises while committing an illegal act (and the 
arresting officer has legally entered the premises to witness that act). However, the Court 
specifically limited the seizure of items pursuant to a valid search warrant to those items 
particularly described in the warrant.222
Prior to the Olmstead case, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence defining searches 
was limited. While the Court did acknowledge that “searching” did not necessarily entail 
physically entering a premises, it was clear that in order to enter a residence or premises a 
federal officer needed a search warrant. The officer could enter the “open fields” 
surrounding the premises without a warrant, but could not actually enter the premises 
itself. The search warrant itself had to be specific in identifying the place to be searched 
and the items to be seized. There were only two permissible ways to avoid this 
requirement: The search-incident-to arrest exception (and even then the officers could 
not search the home of the suspect unless the arrest took place in the home); and the 
“automobile exception,” where automobiles, boats, and other vehicles able to move could 
be searched without a warrant if the officer reasonably suspected that the vehicle 
contained contraband.
Olmstead v. United States was decided in 1928; Murchison describes it as the 
Court’s “most famous prohibition decision.”223 The issue decided by the Justices in the 
case was whether or not the warrantless wire tapping of a defendant’s telephone line 
constituted an impermissible search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment -  that is, 
whether wiretapping was either a “search” or a “seizure.” This was the last case in which
222 M arron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
223 Murchison, Forgotten Influence, 65-68, q u ote on 65.
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the Court would test the contours of the Fourth Amendment during Prohibition. And
again, as warned of in the Gouled decision issued at the beginning of the decade, the
Court circumscribed the rights protected by the Amendment and gave law enforcement.
It was here that Justice Brandeis wrote in his dissent of “the right to be let alone.”224
Understanding how Roy Olmstead operated, how he was caught, and the case as
presented to the court are necessary to understand the dilemmas faced by the Court when
they heard the appeal in 1928.
Roy Olmstead started out his adult life with a career in the Seattle police force. In
1916 he was youngest member of the Seattle police force to achieve the rank of 
0 0  ^lieutenant. He was married and had two children. The mayor was a close friend, as 
was William Boeing. However, in 1920, at age 34, he was arrested under the Volstead 
Act for the sale of liquor. The arrest and guilty plea cost him a five hundred dollar fine
0 0  f \  '  •and his law enforcement career. Undone as a cop, Olmstead dedicated himself his 
criminal enterprise. Realizing that the liquor underworld in Seattle was loosely organized 
and poorly managed and knowing that he could count on the friends he had made in the 
police department to look the other way, Olmstead set about organizing his own
00  7rumrunning operation. With ten men each investing one thousand dollars and
0 0 8Olmstead matching that ten thousand, he had the capital to start his enterprise.
224 Brandeis had already written about privacy law in and 1890 law review  article that he co-authored with 
S. D. Warren. It w as here that he inserted th e  con cep t into federal jurisprudence. "The Right to  Privacy," 
4  Harvard Law Review 193 (1890). This phrase w as picked up by Morris L. Ernst and Alan U. Schwartz in 
Privacy: The Right to Be Left Alone, (New  York: Macmillan, 1962). The law review  article w as focu sed  on 
the "right to be let alone" from th e intrusions o f th e  press and publication o f photographs w ithout 
consent, a tort. Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life (Pantheon: N ew  York, 2009) 100-102.
225 Clark, The Dry Years, 162.
226 Clark, The Dry Years, 163. O lm stead was arrested on March 2 2 ,1 9 2 0  unloading a tugboat. It is unclear 
if it w as his operation, or if he w as simply helping.
227 Clark, The Dry Years, 162 (referring to  th e  com petition  b etw een  rival gangs -  Jack M arquett and th e  
Billingsley brothers (Logan and Fred). See previous chapters of Clark. V andem eer, later O lm stead's
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Olmstead partnered with Consolidated Liquor Exporters, liquor wholesalers in 
Canada, and schemed to avoid the twenty-dollar Canadian tax by drawing up the bills of
•  229lading as if the liquor was being transported to Ensanada, Mexico. After being loaded, 
some of these boats went to small islands in Puget Sound, D’Arcy Island or Discovery 
Island or Portland Island, others headed out to sea. Jack Rhodes, the captain of the 
‘Eva B’ (one of Olmstead’s boats), testified “that [he] left Seattle for the purpose of 
going to Turn Point, Stuart Island, Washington, United States for a load of liquor; that the 
‘Eva B’ received this liquor from another vessel somewhere near the International 
Boundary Line in the vicinity of Turn Point; that after they received the load of liquor the 
‘Eva B’ went to Portland Island, British Columbia, in Canada, there to await nightfall and
231an opportunity of bringing her load safely into American waters.” Smaller craft picked 
up shipments, ran them across the Puget Sound, and arrived in Seattle, sometimes on
attorney, represented  the Billingsleys in 1916, w hen  W ashington S tate en acted  its dry law, -  actually  
setting up a com pany that im ported liquor from Cuba (at least on paper -  the actual liquor was arriving 
from San Francisco). Clark, The Dry Years, 131-132. N ote that V anderm eer w as previously th e prosecutor 
of King County.
228 Clark, The Dry Years, 163. It is unclear from th e court d ocu m ents if th ere w ere ten  or eleven  investors, 
but "Roy w as to  get half and th e other half w as to  be split equally." Erickson et. al. v. U.S. "Assignment of 
Errors" 6. John McLean testified  in th e Olmstead trial that th ere w ere 11 m en with O lm stead  
contributing 11 ,000  dollars. United States v. Olmstead "Bill o f Exceptions" 8, Records o f th e  District 
Courts o f th e United States. Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and Records 
Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
229 Clark, The Dry Years, 164. United States v. Wilber E. Dow, et. at. "Proposed A m endm ents to  th e  
D efendants Proposed Bill o f Exceptions" 16a, 17, 18-19, 37  and U.S. v. Olmstead  "Bill o f Exceptions o f Roy 
O lm stead, et. al." 236, both in Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and Records 
Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
230 Clark, The Dry Years, 164, 165. The Canadian governm ent kept D'Arcy Island as a leprosy station, 
insulating it from "curiosity."
231 Erickson v. United States "Amended A ssignm ent o f Errors" May 1926. 2-3, Record Group 21. Boxes 
369-372, National Archives and Records Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
46
secluded beaches, but often at public docks. The liquor was then offloaded onto 
trucks, one bearing a sign for “Occidental Bread,” one “Sausage, meats and Poultry,” and 
another a pastry symbol. Then the liquor was taken to a farm on the outskirts of town
99 4that Olmstead purchased to use as a warehouse. In Seattle, there was a central office 
with “telephones, typewriters, and office equipment. And one could at any time of the
i
day order and pay for whiskey.”235 Runners would pick up the liquor from the ranch, 
bring it to one of the depots in town -  the Lenora Garage, for example. From there 
runner would deliver orders for customers that included private citizens, hotels, clubs,
99/%golf courses, businesses, and speakeasies. Olmstead employed nearly one hundred 
people, including a lawyer (Jerry Finch) and at least two bookkeepers (Dick Bennett and
9 9 7Bernard Ward). Olmstead provided the residents of Seattle with a varied supply of 
alcohol: Corby’s Rye Whiskey, White Horse Whiskey, Gilmore’s Royal, Old Parr,
Catto’s Rose Label, John Haig Whiskey, Bullock & Lade, Johnny Walker Black and Red 
Label, King George VI Cream Label, Sandy McDonald and Thompson’s Whiskey, 
Gordon Gin, Gilby’s Dry Gin, Dewar’s Extra Special, Old Crow Rye Whiskey, Johnson’s
232 Clark, The Dry Years, 165. They often  used W oodm ont Beach. Liquor w as unloaded at Superior Fish 
Dock, Jahn & Company Dock, Sunde & Olsen's Shipyard, and th e  Lander Street Dock. U.S. v. Wilber E. Dow  
"Proposed A m endm ents to  th e D efendants Proposed Bill of Exceptions" 10, 14, 14a, 16.
233 Erickson v. U.S. "Amended A ssignm ent o f Errors" 7 ,1 2 ,  Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National 
Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle. W hitney rem em bers th e sign as 
"Fresh M eats, Sausages, Flam." U.S. v. Olmstead  "Bill o f Exceptions" 17, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372, 
National Archives and Records Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
234 The Viele Ranch. U.S. v. Olmstead  "Bill of.Exceptions" 11-D, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National 
Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
235 U.S. v. Wilber E. Dow, et. al. "Proposed A m endm ents to  th e D efendants Proposed Bill o f  Exceptions" 5.
236 These included the Puget Mil! Company, th e Seattle Golf & Country Club, and th e Arctic Club. U.S. v. 
Olmstead  "Bill o f Exceptions o f Roy O lm stead, Jerry L. Finch, Myer Berg, Ed Engdahl, John Earle, Cliff 
Maurice, Clarence G. Flealy, Tom Nakagawa, and F. R. Brown" 235, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372, 
National Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
237 Clark, The Dry Years, 164: "scouts, transfer m en, office m en, sa lesm en , te lep h o n e  operators, 
dispatchers, checkers, collectors, bookkeepers, and an attorney." -  federal court: 19 F. 2 nd 849 (9th Cir., 
1927). U.S. v. Olmstead  "Bill o f Exceptions" 9, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and 
Records Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
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Old Rye, King George Gold Label, Hennessy’s Three Star Brandy, Cliquot Champagne, 
peach brandy, Usher’s Green Stripe Whiskey, Chartreuse, red Curacao, Granny Taylor 
Whiskey, Mumm’s Extra Dry Champagne, Gordon’s Sloe Gin, and Benedictine.
Olmstead could import two thousand to four thousand cases per trip. Avoiding 
the 20 dollar surcharge at this volume saved him thousands of dollars, a savings he 
passed on to his customers. While the rest of the country dealt with an astronomical rise 
in liquor prices, Olmstead’s customers paid approximately only two dollars more per 
bottle than Canadian citizens. Even at this low price, Olmstead had earnings of over 
200,000 dollars per month. Because he was buying in bulk and making an immense 
profit, Olmstead did not feel a need to dilute the alcohol with chemicals and flavorings,
9TQthus making him unique among bootleggers. Prohibition Commission Haynes
revealed that, nationally, less than 1 percent of the 60,000 samples of bootleg whiskey
tested by the Prohibition Unit were pure whiskey. The rest “were contaminated -  most of
them by dangerous or poisonous substances.”240 In the first six months of 1923, there
were 647 deaths from drinking poisonous liquor in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and 
1 *
Philadelphia alone. While the rest of the country was plagued by death and disease 
from the effects of diluted liquor, Olmstead’s customers in Seattle were not. Norman 
Clark describes him as, “scrupulously guarding] the integrity of his products, selling
949without adulteration the liquor he brought from Canada.” This helped Olmstead 
succeed in Seattle.
238 Olmstead v. U.S. "Bill o f Exceptions" 55-57, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and 
Records Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
239 Clark, The Dry Years, 165.
240 Haynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 186.
241 Haynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 186-187.
242 Clark, The Dry Years, 165.
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Olmstead still had friends on the police force who would keep him and his 
employees from arrest and his liquor from seizure. These officers did not help simply out 
of friendship; Olmstead paid a significant amount to the department in bribes, and indeed 
without graft men like Olmstead could never have risen to power. Edwin T. Hunt, 
headquarters clerk of the Seattle Police Department at the time, said that the going rates 
for graft in Seattle were: fifty dollars per month per joint. This was due on the tenth of 
the month and split between the Dry Squad, the Chief of Police, and the Mayor. Any 
“joint” that did not pay was raided.243 This graft was estimated to amount to between 
seventy-six and eighty thousand dollars per month for the Chief of Police and higher 
ups.244 Lee Parker, deputy sheriff of King County from 1922 or 1923 through May 
1926, helped Olmstead transfer loads of alcohol from the beaches to the ranch. He was 
paid 250 dollars a month for this work.245 He was also tipped off by the police. Richard 
Fryant, Prohibition agent and wiretapper, testified that “Christy of the Dry Squad had 
called [Olmstead]... and told him that they were going to raid it.” He paid off Coast 
Guard men to let his boats pass without incident.247 He also had friends on the Canadian 
police force that helped smooth his export papers, and he bribed Customs officials in 
Canada and in the United States.
The individuals involved in Olmstead’s arrest were typical of the Prohibition 
period. Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for the Pacific Northwest, William M.
243 Gerald v. Close, "Memo," June 19, 1931. Record Group 56. Box 1.
244 "GRAFT," May 8, 1931. Record Group 56. Box 1.
245 U. S. v. Wilber E. Dow, "Proposed A m endm ents to  th e D efendants Proposed Bill o f Exceptions," 33, 
Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. 
Seattle.
246 Olmstead v. U.S. "Governm ent's Proposed A m endm ent to th e  Bill o f Exceptions" 71, Record Group 21. 
Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
247 U.S. v. Wilber E. Dow  "Bill o f Exceptions" 11-12, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives 
and Records Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
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Whitney, headed the investigation under the watchful eye of Administrator Roy C. Lyle. 
Prior to joining the Bureau, Whitney had no experience in law enforcement; Roy Lyle 
failed his civil service examination in 1927.248 Whitney was accused by Olmstead and 
other defendants of threatening the foreman of the grand jury, a client of Olmstead, with 
adding his name to the “bottom of the list” of defendants in the Olmstead case if he did 
not return the indictment without any changes.249 And, shortly after the Olmstead case 
had been decided by the Supreme Court, Whitney and Lyle were indicted for “conspiracy
9 snto take a bribe” and conspiracy to violate the Volstead Act. Roy Olmstead left McNeil 
Penitentiary and testified at their trial for the prosecution. They were found not guilty, 
but the evidence was far from conclusive.251 By 1931, Lyle had become Supervisor of 
Permits for the Bureau of Industrial Alcohol and was under investigation for granting the 
Heinrich Brewing Company of Seattle a permit to manufacture wort, knowing that the 
Brewery intended to manufacture beer. Whitney was the legal counsel for the Heinrich 
Brewing Company, advising them and offering to represent anyone arrested. He was also 
under investigation 252
The Bureau located an inside man to help take down Olmstead in Al Hubbard. 
Facing the threat of prosecution, Hubbard offered to turn traitor, and Lyle made him an 
agent of the Prohibition Bureau. Hubbard was close to his prey: prior to joining the 
Bureau as an undercover agent, Hubbard had been living with Olmstead and his wife. He
248 Clark, The Dry Years, 178.
249 U.S. v. Olmstead  "Plea in Abatem ent" 4-5. Roy O lm stead. April 4, 1925, Record Group 21. Boxes 369- 
372, National Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
250 New York Times, "Seattle Dry Chief and Aides Indicted," May 2 7 ,1 9 3 0 . Corwin and Fryant w ere also  
included in the indictm ent. O lm stead accused W hitney of being th e m aster mind o f th e operation for 
which he had b een  im prisoned.
251 Clark, The Dry Years, 211-215 .
252 R. A. Beman, "Letter to  L. Dean Hickman," July 14, 1932, "Letter to  Bureau o f Prohibition, D.C.,"
January 10, 1932, and "Memo," July 6, 1932. Record Group 56. Folder 45-A. Conspiracy to  transport 
alcohol b etw een  California and Oregon.
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designed and built the receiver for Olmstead’s radio station that broadcast from his 
residence (KFOX -  the first in Seattle).253 Like others, this agent had no experience in 
law enforcement. He was accused of buying and selling alcohol while a Prohibition 
agent; he was accused of selling 8,000 cases of liquor at 1 dollar a case for his own 
profit.254 Years after the Olmstead trial, Hubbard was still working for the Bureau, 
though in 1931 Charles A. Murphy, Agent in Charge, wrote that he “did not want 
anything to do with any case in which Mr. Hubbard would be revealed; that he was 
dynamite... [if] the informant should be Mr. Hubbard... we would undoubtedly lose the 
case.” By 1931, Hubbard had joined the system of corruption, “shaking down what 
liquor he could.” 255
The last member of this team of agents was Richard Fry ant. Previously the 
Deputy Sheriff of King Country and a telephone lineman for ten years, Fryant had 
become a private investigator. Fryant wiretapped Olmstead’s office line at first to 
blackmail him. When Olmstead refused to pay the ten thousand dollars Fryant 
demanded, Fryant turned to Whitney and offered the wiretaps and the information 
available to him instead. Like Hubbard, Whitney made Fryant a Bureau agent. He 
set to tapping the phones at Olmstead’s office, his co-conspirators’ homes (Dick Elbro, 
Herbert Fletcher, Sid Green, and Mr. Parkhurst) and his lawyer’s office (Jerry Finch).
253 Olm stead founded th e  American Radio Telegraph Company, S eattle 's first radio station -  KFOX. Clark, 
The Dry Years, 165. Clark, The Dry Years, 171 (Hubbard's appointm ent).
254 U.S. \j. Wilber E. Dow, "Proposed A m endm ents to th e D efendants Proposed Bill o f Exceptions" 1; "Bill 
of Exceptions" 1-2, both in Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372, National Archives and Records 
Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
255 Charles A. Murphy, "Letter," Record Group 56. Box 1. Seattle Conspiracy.
256 Olmstead v. U.S. "Bill o f Exceptions" 121, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and 
Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
257 Olmstead v. U.S. "Bill o f Exceptions" 149, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and 
Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
258 Clark, The Dry Years, 168.
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Fryant tapped the three phones in the office at 1025 Henry Building in June 1924, Dick 
Elbro’s home phone in July (11) 1924, Olmstead’s home phone at the end of July (30) 
1924, Finch’s office at the beginning of August 1924, Herbert Fletcher’s home phone in 
August (8) 1924, Sid Green’s home phone and Mr. Parkhurst’s home phone in 
September (9) 1924, 259 By 1931, this wiretapper/agent became known as “the first 
person contacted by bootleggers who desire to open protected ‘joints’ in King 
County.”260
These were the men pursuing Olmstead. There was no evidence for their 
corruption at the time of the trial, but it is significant that the men who brought down one 
of the biggest rumrunners in the country later seemed dirtier than Olmstead himself.
Federal agents began listening to the conversations over the wiretap in June of 
1924.261 They had placed taps on Olmstead’s home, Finch’s office, the switchboard 
office of the operation, and several homes of members of the organization. Technology 
to tape the conversations did not exist at the time, so the federal agents would take turns
9 A 9listening in on Olmstead’s conversations and taking notes. Olmstead was aware that 
the lines were being tapped -  his home, his office, his lawyer’s office, and homes of his 
employees. Bill Smith called Charles S. Green’s home (both defendants) and told the
259 Olmstead v. US. "Bill o f Exceptions" 121, 134, 138, 142, 143, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372,
National Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
260 Gerald V. Close, "Memo," June 18, 1931. Record Group 56. Box 1. S eattle Conspiracy.
261 Erickson v. U.S. "Amended A ssignm ent o f Errors" 27, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National 
Archives and Records Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
262 W hitney's w ife took  th e  transcriptions and copied them  into longhand and then  typed them  into what 
w ould be known in th e trial as the Black Book. The original n otes w ere not kept by th e agents; they relied 
in court on th e Black Book to  refresh their recollections of specific conversations. During the trial, 
O lm stead's attorney, G eorge V anderm eer, objected  repeatedly to  th e use o f th e  Black Book because  
there w as no way to  be certain that its con ten ts w ere verbatim  th e conversations that took  place because  
of the repeated  copying of th e  transcriptions and disposal of th e  original n otes. He also objected  because
he w as not allow ed to  view  th e Black Book, as its con ten ts w ere never adm itted  into evidence. W hile the  
appellate courts refused his appeal on th e se  tw o issues, it is certainly d eb atab le w h eth er or not sustaining  
th e se  objections w as reversible error by th e trial judge.
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woman who answered “Roy had given instructions that all their lines had been tapped 
and to have no further conversations over any of the lines that would be of any 
importance... be careful what you say as this line is tapped by the Federals.”264 On the 
basis of the information gleaned from the wiretapped phone calls, Whitney got a federal
265warrant to search Olmstead’s house for alcohol. The conversations overheard via the 
wiretaps suggested that Olmstead was carrying on his alcohol distribution business from 
his home. Search warrants were also served on Finch’s office, the business office of
9^7the organization, and the homes of other defendants. On September 17, 1924, Whitney
arrived with his wife and other agents while Olmstead and his wife were hosting a dinner 
party.268 A thorough search turned up no alcohol, but the agents stayed in the Olmstead 
home. Whitney and his wife took turns calling Olmstead’s known friends and associates, 
pretending to be the Olmsteads. They told each person on the other end of the line that 
they were having a party and to come by with some liquor. As people arrived, they were 
arrested. At 2:30 in the morning, all of those arrested were taken to the Prohibition office
9 AQfor questioning. Several of the people present at the party or who arrived after the
264 Erickson v. U.S. "Amended A ssignm ent o f Errors" 57, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National 
Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
2650 lm stead , via Jerry Finch, su ed  th e governm ent for dam ages resulting from this probable illegal search. 
Olmstead v. D. H. Blair, et al. "Complaint" 1-8. D ecem ber 20, 1924. Finch v. Revelle et. al. "Brief" 1-4. All 
in Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska 
Region. Seattle.
266 U.S. v. Olmstead "Affdavit o f Earl Corwin in Opposition to  Petition to  Suppress" 2, Record Group 21. 
Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and Records Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
267 U.S. v. Olmstead "Petition to  Quash Search Warrant, Return Property and Suppress Evidence" 'Exhibit 
C / (Search warrant for 3757  Ridgeway Place -  th e  O lm stead residence), 'Exhibit F' (Search warrant for 
Room 1026 L. C. Smith Building -  offices). All in Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and 
Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
268 Erickson v. U.S. "Amended A ssignm ent of Errors" 49, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National 
Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
269 A nother point o f potentially reversible error is that Section 25 of th e  V olstead Act allow ed a search  
warrant for a private h om e only on probable cause that there w as a sale o f alcoholic b everages within 
that residence. As no sale w as taking place, and th e search turned up no alcohol, th e agents should have 
left th e prem ises. U.S. v. Olmstead  "Bill o f Exceptions" 90-91. April 19, 1926. U.S. v. Olmstead Bill of
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Whitneys’ calls were listed on the arrest warrant. Those who were not were arrested 
because their presence at the house, which was putatively being used for the illegal 
distribution of alcohol, made them potential coconspirators. In all, there were ninety-one 
people listed as defendants in the Olmstead case, including his attorney.270 Some of these 
defendants plead out; some fled to Canada; the rest were tried with Olmstead in 
Seattle.271
As Olmstead’s own attorney was one of his co-defendants, another representative
9 79was needed. Some of his employees had already hired George Vandermeer as their
97^counsel, and Olmstead also became one of his clients as well. Vandemeer had gained 
national recognition as a tenacious and brilliant attorney for his representation of the 
Wobblies, the members of the Industrial Workers of the World.274 He had also gained a 
reputation in Seattle as an excellent defender of those tried on Volstead violations.275
9 l f \The trial began on January 19, 1926. Vanderveer was a diligent and powerful orator 
who did all he could to both defend his clients at the trial and preserve the wiretapping 
issue for appeal. He intended to prove that “the tapping of a telephone line was injurious
Exceptions o f O lm stead et. al." 254. Testim ony o f Elsie O lm stead. Both in Record Group 21. Boxes 369- 
372, National Archives and Records Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle .
270 Clark, The Dry Years, 169.
271 Clark, The Dry Years, 170.
272 Clark, The Dry Years, 170. Jerry Finch actually rem ained as co-coun sel for th e  d efen se, filing suit 
against the Pacific T elephone and Telegraph Company for allowing th e wire taps to  be placed. He also 
petitioned  th e court to  return th e  ev idence seized  from his office, contending that th e  search and seizure 
violated O lm stead's attorney-client privilege. This suit w as partially successfu l, as th e court prohibited the  
evidence seized  from  Finch's office from use against Finch and O lm stead (but it w as perm issible to  use it 
against th e other eighty-n ine defendants). Clark, The Dry Years, 170.
273 There w ere 12 attorneys for th e m en on trial with O lm stead. U.S. v. Olmstead  "Bill of Exceptions" 1-2, 
Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. 
Seattle.
274 Clark, The Dry Years, 170.
275 Clark, The Dry Years, 131-132.
276 U.S. v. Olmstead "Bill o f Exceptions o f Roy Olm stead, etc." 1, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372,
National Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
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to the service rendered to the extent that it destroyed or impaired the privacy of the 
service to business and professional men and to the home, and that it opened up the 
possibility of stealing service, and it consumed a certain amount of the electrical energy
0T1on which the efficiency of the service depended.” Judge Jeremiah Neterer admitted the 
evidence from the wiretapping. The jury found Olmstead and most of his co-defendants
17Rguilty on February 20, 1926. Neterer found that the “user of a telephone has no 
property interest in it. He has a license to use it.” In addition, foreshadowing Chief 
Justice William Taft’s opinion for the majority when the case reached the Supreme Court, 
Neterer pointed out that “the wire carrying this message was not tapped within the house,
- the home was not violated.”279 On March 9, 1926, Olmstead was fined ten thousand 
dollars and sentenced to four years at McNeil Island Penitentiary.
Olmstead’s appeal to the Supreme Court hinged on the wiretapping issue.
Though wiretapping was illegal in Seattle under a state statute, there was no federal 
legislation prohibiting agents from wiretapping or using evidence obtained from a 
wiretap at trial. However, the issue of wiretapping was contentious at the time, both for 
the public and within the federal government itself. For the public, wiretapping was 
viewed as yet another example of the government encroaching on personal liberty. For 
some in the federal law enforcement agencies, it was unethical. Mabel Walker 
Willebrandt, Assistant Attorney General at the time of Olmstead’s appeal, refused to 
represent the government in arguing the case before the Supreme Court. She believed
277 Erickson v. U.S. "Am endm ed A ssignm ent o f Errors" 22-23, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National 
Archives and Records Adm inistration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
278 U.S. v. Olmstead "Verdict" 1, Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and Records 
Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
279 U.S. v. Olmstead "Opinion o f th e Court (On M otion to Supress w ire-tapping conversations as 
evidence)" 1. January 1 8 ,1 9 2 6 , Record Group 21. Boxes 369-372 , National Archives and Records 
Administration -  Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
55
that wiretapping is “a dangerous and unwarranted practice to follow in enforcing the 
law.” Others in law enforcement thought it was “an essential medium against the large
7 O Aliquor syndicate, and can not be replaced.”
On first application, Olmstead’s appeal to the Supreme Court was denied in 1927. 
Soon after, other similar cases were appealed to the Supreme Court for review. In 1928, 
the Court accepted certiorari, agreeing to hear the appeal, for three cases, including 
Olmstead, on the limited review of the constitutionality of admission of the warrantless 
wiretapping evidence. The court split 5-4 upholding the verdict against Olmstead, with
9521each of the dissenting justices writing a separate opinion.
Chief Justice Howard Taft wrote the majority opinion, stating from the outset that 
the decision was, “confined to the single question whether the use of evidence of private 
telephone conversations between the defendant and others, intercepted by means of wire 
tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.” The opinion 
continued with a summation of the evidence against Olmstead, testified to at trial. He 
then summarized the existing Supreme Court doctrines applicable to the case. Boyd v. 
United States widened the scope of search and seizure, as protected by the Fourth 
amendment, to government actions not amounting to a physical search of property or 
seizure of materials therein. Weeks v. United States provided that evidence obtained by 
government officials without a valid search warrant was inadmissible at trial. Taft 
insisted that the language of the Fourth Amendment refers to material things seized and 
physical places searched. By this logic, “There was no searching. There was no seizure.
280 House C om m ittee on Expenditures in th e Executive Departm ents, Wire Tapping in Law Enforcement,
71st Cong., 3rd sess., 1931, 18-19.
281 The case is referred to  as Olmstead et. al. v. United States, but th e cases d ecided  in tandem  w ere  
Green et al. v. United States, and Mclnnis v. United States (277 U.S. 438).
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The evidence secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no 
entry of the houses of [sic] offices of the defendants.” He differentiated the Olmstead 
case from others invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment, writing that the 
Fourth Amendment is “not violated against a defendant unless there has been an official 
search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material 
effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of 
making a seizure.” The majority opinion held that “the wire tapping here disclosed does 
not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Taft 
wrote that, even though the evidence may have been obtained unethically, this does not 
bar its admission at trial. He suggested at one point that the legislature, if it deemed 
wiretapping unethical, could create laws forbidding federal agents from collecting 
evidence in this manner, but the Court was unwilling to find wiretapping as 
constitutionally prohibited. He also notes that the Washington Wiretapping Statute,
while making interception of telephone messages a misdemeanor, and thus criminal, it
• 282 does not specifically bar the admission into evidence of those messages.
Justice Brandeis wrote the most notable dissent from the majority opinion. In it 
he expounded on the privacy rights that would be embraced by the Court later in the 
twentieth century. His dissent that is often cited by those seeking protection under the 
Fourth Amendment from government interference in privacy rights of all kinds. He 
wrote in his dissent of the changing nature of technology, certainly beyond that 
envisioned when the Bill of Rights was first authored. And with these changes, “subtler
282 Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438 , 455 , 468; Boyd v. U.S. 116 U.S. 616; Weeks v. U.S. 232 U.S. 383. 
"Curtilage" refers to  th e physical area im m ediately surrounding a h ouse, but still on th e  property o f th e  
hom eow ner. The cartilage is within th e scop e o f  Fourth A m endm ent protections, w hereas "open fields" 
are not.
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and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the 
Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by 
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain.disclosure in court of 
what is whispered in the closet.” Brandeis foresaw more technological advances that 
would allow government espionage to intrude further on individuals’ privacy. Brandeis 
remembered Boyd differently than Taft; he quoted from the Boyd decision, “The 
principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and 
security... they apply to all invasions on the part of the Government and its employees of 
the sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his 
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but 
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private 
property.” After discussing the liberal application of Boyd to situations that did not 
involve a literal search or seizure, Brandeis launched into his oft-quoted passage.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable 
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual 
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, 
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to‘be found in material things. They sought 
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their 
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone -  
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To 
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of 
the Fifth.... Men bom to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their 
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
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Brandeis also believed, that regardless of the Constitutional issues, the evidence should 
not have been admitted as it was obtained in violation of the state statute.
Justice Holmes, concurred with Brandeis and wrote, “the Government ought not 
to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act,” calling wiretapping 
“dirty business.”284 He felt that Weeks should apply to this case: “the reason for 
excluding evidence obtained by violating the Constitution seems to me logically to lead 
to excluding evidence obtained by a crime of the officers of law.” Justice Butler 
dissented from Taft’s literal interpretation of the words of the Fourth Amendment, 
arguing instead that the Constitution should be interpreted “in light of the principles upon 
which it was founded.” He believed that there was a privacy interest in the 
communications and their transmission by telephone, and that the eavesdropping 
“constituted a search for evidence.” Justice Stone concurred with the opinions of 
Holmes, Brandeis, and Butler. He also noted that the Court may consider questions
• 0 ft Sbeyond the single issue upon which certiorari was granted.
Brandeis met all of the concerns about the enforcement of Prohibition and the 
Volstead Act itself in his analysis. He wrote specifically that wiretapping technology 
allowed the government access to presumed personal conversations that should be 
afforded the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, he locates the right to 
privacy conceptually, not determined by residence or property rights -  the “material 
things” from which he distances his argument. It is liberty itself -  “beliefs, thoughts, 
emotions” -  that the Fourth Amendment should protect from governmental intrusion.
283 Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438 , 473 , 474-5, 478 , (Brandeis d issenting), citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 
H owell's S tate Trials, 1030.
284 Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 469 , 470 , (Holm es dissenting).
285 Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 469-471 , 487, 488, (Butler and Stone dissenting).
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Without being explicit, he puts the Volstead Act itself in conflict with the Fourth 
Amendment. Not only should citizens have an expectation that what happens in their 
home is protected, but they should also be afforded the “right to be let alone” from 
unreasonable government intrusion in all aspects of their life. Melvin I. Urofsky noted 
that Brandeis’s dissent shifted the emphasis [of the Fourth Amendment] from where the 
alleged wrong took place to how it affected the individual.”
Looking at the reality of Prohibition enforcement in tandem with the 
Constitutional doctrine affords an opportunity to see the law and society interacting in a 
way that is often difficult to parse out. The sudden surge of Fourth Amendment cases 
was directly related to Volstead and its enforcement -  the Court was forced to examine 
the Fourth Amendment in a way that it had not had to before Prohibition. The new 
circumstances of daily life created situations that tested the boundaries of a certain aspect 
of jurisprudence. This happens any time a case makes its way to the Court: the law never 
exists in a vacuum, completely separated from the society in which it evolves. However, 
the cases decided prior to the Olmstead decision, and Olmstead itself, all dealt with 
Volstead and its enforcement. All of these cases forced examination of the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court increasingly circumscribed the contours of exceptions to the 
search and seizure requirements. Finally, in Olmstead, four Justices agreed that the 
protections of the Amendment had been violated. Four wanted to explore the other side 
of the Amendment -  the contours of the right protected, the line at which governmental 
intrusion was not acceptable. Those four wanted the assumption to be that a citizen has
287 Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis, 631.
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the right to be left alone.288 While not enough to create the right to privacy at the time, 
this case was nonetheless decided by the slimmest of majorities possible. Olmstead was 
overturned in 1967 when the Court, in Katz v. United States, held that the Fourth 
Amendment protections apply when a person has an actual expectation of privacy that is 
“reasonable” by society’s standards. Physical trespass was not necessary for a 
government official’s actions to constitute an unconstitutional search -  “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”289
The significance of Prohibition itself to this evolution of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is highlighted by the fact that these issues were not re-examined for years. 
Once the Twenty-First Amendment was ratified, and Prohibition enforcement was no 
longer an issue, there was not the same flood of cases created by the methods and 
circumstances of the Prohibition Bureau and the Prohibition law to force the Court to 
opine about the Fourth Amendment, or government overreaching, or privacy. And so, 
the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine slowed until the 1960s, when legal aid 
societies and bar associations began to concern themselves with the rights of the accused. 
After the 1920s, there was no similar temporal surge in cases that tested the Fourth 
Amendment, and no specific law being enforced. However, since the Eighteenth 
Amendment was repealed, most of the cases brought to the Supreme Court for Fourth 
Amendment violations are “vice” cases -  gambling, pornography, but mostly drugs.
Even Katz involved the FBI investigating a gambling ring. The Fourth Amendment is
288 Norman H. Clark roots th e se  developing concerns for "individual civil liberty" and "private morality" in 
m odernity i t s e l f -  want-gratification dem ands protection for privacy. Deliver Us From Evil, 178. Ulofsky 
n otes that Brandeis "argued that judges n eed  to  take th e facts of m odern life into account in their 
decisions." Louis D. Brandeis, xi.
289 Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 347-8  (1967).
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constantly tested in situations where the government oversteps boundaries to enforce a 
law and the law itself implicates privacy concerns 290
The nature of privacy has been constantly negotiated throughout the twentieth 
century. It is certainly the intent of the paper to encourage the reader to compare this 
analysis to modem discussions of the limits of government intrusion with the advent of 
new criminal organizations (the “terrorist” and the “drug czar”), a newly reorganized 
federal investigation and enforcement agency (Homeland Security), and public 
dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the laws this agency enforces (screenings in 
airports, widespread use of marijuana).291 Investigative technologies continue to improve; 
the government practically has the ability to know the contents of every American 
communication made via the internet or telephone. Justice Brandeis articulated a concern 
with the limitations that the Fourth Amendment places on government intrusion into the 
private lives of its citizenry that still resonates nearly a century later -  the contours of the 
“right to be let alone.”
290 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48  (1951) -  drugs; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) -  
drugs; M app v. Ohio , 367  U.S. 643 (1961) -  gambling, pornography; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
-  drugs; Beck v. Ohio, 379  U.S. 89 (1964) -  drugs; Spinelli i/. United States, 393 U.S. 410  (1969) -  
gambling; Adams v. Williams, 407  U.S. 143 (1972) -  drugs; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
-  drugs; Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) -  drugs; United States v. Havens, 446  U.S. 620 (1980) -  
drugs; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) -  drugs; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) -  drugs; 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479  U.S. 367 (1987) -  drugs; M urray v. U.S. 487  U.S. 533 (1988) -  drugs; United States 
v. Sokolow, 490  U.S. 1 (1989) -  drugs; Floridg v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) -  drugs; Alabam a v. White, 496  
U.S. 325 (1990) -  drugs; Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429  (1991) -  drugs; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806 (1996) -  drugs; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) -  drugs; Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334  
(2000) -  drugs; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) -  drugs; Board o f Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822  
(2002) -  drugs.
291 Roy O lm stead served  his four years at McNeil Island Penitentiary, Upon his re lease in May 1931, he 
took  a job with a credit bureau. He becam e a Christian Scientist w hile in prison and after his release  
worked am ong th e prisoners at McNeil Island. Clark, The Dry Years, 239. He w as pardoned by President 
Franklin Delano R oosevelt on D ecem ber 2 5 ,1 9 3 5 . For a short description o f his work as a Christian 
Scientist, see: h ttp ://w w w .n orca lch ristian sc ien ce .com /2010 /12 /red em p tion -of-roy-o lm stead .h tm l, 
accessed  March 1, 2011.
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